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INTRODUCTION
In 1958 Kentucky became the third state to enact the Uniform
Commercial Code promulgated by the American Law Institute
(ALl) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (NCCUSL).' The General Assembly stated that
this legislation was intended to modernize, clarify and simplify
the law of commercial transactions. 2 Enactment of the Code also
evidenced the legislature's intent to make Kentucky commercial
law uniform with that of the other states.3 Subsequent General
Assemblies further implemented these policies by enacting sub-
stantially all of the uniform amendments to the Code proposed
by the ALI and NCCUSL through 1964. 4
1 See Act of Mar. 28, 1958, ch. 77, 1958 Ky. AcTs 214 (codified at KY. REv.
STAT. chapter 355 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS]). The first and second
states were, respectively, Pennsylvania (1953) and Massachusetts (1957). See generally
ALI & NAT'L CONT. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1958 OFsciAL TEXT OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE v-vi [hereinafter cited as 1958 Official Text]. For a brief
history of the Code through its enactment in Kentucky, see Young, Scope, Purposes,
and Functions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Ky. L.J. 192, 192-95 (1959-60).
2 See KRS § 355.1-102(2)(a).
See KRS § 355.1-102(2)(c). Forty-nine states have enacted the Code. Louisiana
has enacted only some of its provisions. See U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) state
correlation tables (1979) [hereinafter cited as TABLEs].
4 Kentucky originally enacted the 1957 Official Edition of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. See ALI & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1957 OFFICIAL
EDITION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. See 1958 OmFIctAL TEXT, supra note 1, at
v-vi. The 1962 General Assembly conformed Kentucky's code to the 1958 OFFCIAL. TEXT.
See Act of Mar. 9, 1962, ch. 83, 1962 Ky. ACTS 327 (codified at KRS chapter 355). See
also Whiteside, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 Ky. L.J. 3, 3-4 (1962-63).
The 1964 General Assembly brought Kentucky's code into line with the 1962 Official
Text of the Uniform Commercial Code. Compare 1964 Ky. ACTS, ch. 130 (codified at
KRS chapter 355) with ALI & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1962
OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as 1962 OFFICIAL
TEXT]. See also ALI & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REPORT No.
I OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE INCLUDING
THE 1962 OFFCIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF Tm CODE 17-63 (1962).
The General Assembly did not enact the language changes proposed by the 1962 AMEND-
MENTS for UCC §§ 6-106 and 9-103.
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Unfortunately, these enactments represent our legislature's
last successful efforts to update Kentucky's Uniform Commercial
Code. 5 None of the uniform amendments promulgated by the
ALI and NCCUSL since 1964 have been enacted in Kentucky. 6
Most importantly, Kentucky lacks the 1972 Official Amendments
to the Code which relate to secured financing and which have
been substantially enacted in at least forty-four jurisdictions.7
Kentucky also lacks the 1977 Official Amendments which relate
to investment securities and which have been substantially en-
acted in at least seventeen jurisdictions.8
The purpose of this Article is to highlight the various sets
of uniform amendments against the backdrop of current Ken-
tucky law. Hopefully this Article will facilitate discussion by
persons interested in whether the amendments should be enacted
in Kentucky and will serve as a guide in the event they are
5 A Special Study Commission (chaired by Senator David Karem) established by
the Legislative Research Commission is currently reviewing the Kentucky Uniform Com-
mercial Code and may make recommendations for amendments to the 1986 General
Assembly. The authors of this Article are not members of the special Commission but
have been informal participants in its meetings. In 1980, H.R. 673 (BR 344) containing
the 1972 Amendments was introduced in the General Assembly but was not enacted.
H.R. 683, 1980 Reg. Sess., 14 LEG. REc. 60 (Apr. 16, 1980).
6 The most substantial uniform amendments were adopted in 1977 and 1972
dealing, respectively, with investment securities (Article Eight) and secured transactions
(Article Nine). See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTICLE 8 AND RELATED CHANGES IN OTHER ARTICLES (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 AMENDMENTS]; ALI & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, 1972 OFFCIL TEXT AND COMMENTS OF ARTICLE 9 SECURED TRANSACTIONS
AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO RELATED SECTIONS rITH SUPPLEMENTARY TEXT
SHOWING ADDITIONS AND DELETIONS AND STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR CHANGES MADE
(1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 AMENDMENTS]. See also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD
FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REvIEw COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT (1971) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
Other official amendments were promulgated in 1966. See REPORT No. 3 oF THE PER-
MANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE INCLUDING THE 1966
OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE CODE (1967). None of these
amendments have been enacted in Kentucky. However, in 1972, a provision similar to
§ 8-102(3) of the 1977 Amendments was enacted. See KRS § 355.8-102(3) (Cum. Supp.
1984). See generally Dantzer, Securities Transfers Without Certificates: Amendments to
Section 8-102, 7 U.C.C. L.J. 109 (1974). All the uniform amendments are now reflected
in ALI & NAT'L CONT. oF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1978 OFCrAIL TEXT OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
See I SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE (CCH) 650A (May 14, 1985). One or
more of the 1966 Amendments have been enacted in at least 26 jurisdictions. See generally
TABLES, supra note 3.
1 See note 7 supra.
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enacted. It may also assist Kentucky lawyers who encounter the
amendments as part of some other jurisdiction's laws, a likely
event given the amendments' wide adoption and the interstate
character of many commercial transactions and law practices. 9
The provisions of the Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code
currently found in chapter 355 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) will be referred to herein as the present UCC or Code. 0
The various uniform texts and amendments will be designated
by reference to their respective year of adoption by the ALI and
NCCUSL.11
I. THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
The secured transactions provisions in Article Nine of the
present Code are unique in their commercial significance. No
other UCC article affects as many commercial transactions,
touches the professional lives of as many commercial practition-
ers, or is more critical in the crucible of debtor insolvency and
bankruptcy. 12 The 1972 Amendments are the product of an in-
depth study intended to clarify Article Nine and to answer
questions that arose concerning its operation.13 However, it is
far from a complete redraft. Changes were kept to a minimum
in recognition of the fact that the Article generally operates in
a satisfactory manner and that many of the problems perceived
by critics and commentators were of more theoretical than prac-
tical importance.1 4 The following is a discussion of the most
9 For example, Ohio, Virginia and West Virginia have enacted the 1972 and 1977
Amendments. See TABLES, supra note 3.
10 The Kentucky Code contains several nonuniform provisions not found in any
of the official ALI and NCCUSL texts. See TABLES, supra note 3, at 185-90; TABLES,
supra note 3, at 67-69 (Supp. June, 1984); Whiteside, supra note 4, at 4-15. These
provisions are considered by this Article when relevant.
" For example, see 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at § 9-102 and UCC § 9-102
(1972). ALI and NCCUSL publications containing the amendments and their drafting
history are described in notes 4 and 6 supra.
12 See generally Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477, 479-81
(1972-73).
"See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at vii-ix, 195-96; 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note
6, at vii-ix. A few of the amended provisions relate to other articles. See UCC §§ 1-
105, 1-201, 2-107, 5-116 (1972).




important secured transactions topics which would be affected
by enactment of the 1972 Amendments.
A. Scope of Article Nine
Article Nine of the present UCC broadly applies to any
transaction, regardless of its form, which is intended to create
a security interest in personal property. 15 Excluded from its
provisions are various types of collateral or transactions that are
governed by other laws, that are noncommercial in nature, or
that are excluded for other reasons. 16 Some of the changes in
coverage that would result from enactment of the 1972 Amend-
ments relate to conflict of laws, proceeds, leases and consign-
ments.1 7 Other 1972 Amendments would either expand or contract
the present Code's coverage in various ways. 8
The 1972 Amendments would provide Code coverage of
financing arrangements in the form of equipment trusts covering
railway rolling stock.' 9 These trusts originally were excluded
from the official text of the UCC as too specialized to fall within
the scope of a general personal property security law. 20 Subse-
quently, it was determined that a better approach would be to
include these trusts within Article Nine as another type of se-
cured financing, but to exclude them from Article Nine's filing
requirements. 21
Enacting the 1972 Amendments would also make clear that
a judgment taken on a right to payment (such as an account
receivable) serving as collateral under a security agreement is
is See KRS § 355.9-102.
16 See KRS § 355.9-104. See generally Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Skyways Enters., 580
S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1979) (perfection of security in aircraft governed by federal law);
Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the U.C.C. - Part IV The Scope
of Article 9, 77 CoM. L.J. 79 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hawkland, Part IP].
11 For a discussion of the effect of the 1972 AmiENDMENTS in these areas, see notes
384-515 infra and accompanying text (conflict of laws); notes 135-37 infra and accom-
panying text (proceeds); notes 33-42 infra and accompanying text (leases and consign-
ments).
11 Some of the scope amendments merely reflect the decision to delete "contract
rights" as a separate collateral category. See notes 45-51 infra and accompanying text.
19 See UCC § 9-104 (1972). This amendment would delete the exclusion applicable
for these trusts in KRS § 355.9-104(e). See 1972 AMim m Ts, supra note 6, at 188.
"o See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 242.
", See UCC § 9-302(3)(a) (1972). See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 242;
1972 AmENDMNTS, supra note 6, at 189.
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within the scope of the Code despite its general nonapplicability
to judgment assignments.22
The 1972 Amendments would reduce the present Code's
scope by excluding security interests created by government debt-
ors. 23 This amendment clarifies that government borrowing-
collateralized by assignments of utility charges, rent from college
dormitories, and the like-is left to extra-Code law dealing with
government finance3 4 However, this amendment is broadly
worded and all governmental secured transactions may be ex-
cluded. The breadth of this exclusion has been criticized as
inconsistent with the Article Nine policy of unifying personal
property security law and because of uncertainty concerning the
extra-Code legal framework for governmental finance.25
Transfers of a single account to an assignee in complete or
partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness would also be
expressly excluded from the present Code's scope if the 1972
Amendments were enacted in Kentucky. 26 The present Code has
previously been interpreted to be inapplicable to these assign-
ments.2 7 The rationale for this amendment is that ordinarily such
transfers are not part of commercial financing transactions.2 8
This amendment would be consistent with other provisions al-
ready contained in the present Code.29
Definitions play an important role in defining the scope of
Article Nine. By amending the definition of "document" the
1972 Amendments would, if enacted, make clear that the UCC
applies to consensual security interests in certain documents of
title issued by owners of goods (such as owners of whiskey or
grain) as well as to documents issued by commercial bailees
(such as warehousemen).30 This amendment is intended by the
- See UCC § 9-104(h) (1972).
See UCC § 9-104(e) (1972).
See UCC § 9-104 comment 5 (1972).
2 See generally Ayer, The New Article 9 and the California Commercial Code, 21
UCLA L. Rv. 937, 968 (1973-74); Hawkland, Part IV, supra note 16, at 82.
26 See UCC § 9-104(0 and comment 6 (1972).
27 See Spurlin v. Sloan, 368 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1963). The opposite conclusion has
been reached under the same statutory language. See Consolidated Film Indus. v. United
States, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1354 (D. Utah 1975).
See UCC § 9-104(0 and comment 6 (1972).
See KRS §§ 355.9-104(0, .9-302(1)(e).
° See UCC § 9-105(0 (1972). See also FiAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 242. The
class of owners that may issue receipts is specified in KRS § 355.7-201(2).
19851
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ALI and NCCUSL to have the effect of conforming the Code
to the reasonable but incorrect assumption on the part of some
financers that security interests in owner-issued documents of
title were within its scope.31
The 1972 Amendments also would modify the present Code's
application to timber and minerals. These changes will be con-
sidered along with other mineral and timber finance related
issues in a subsequent part of this Article. 32
B. Consignments and Leases
Article Nine of the present Code applies to leases and con-
signments that actually are secured transactions. 33 "True" con-
signments and leases are not subject to Article Nine but are
governed by Article Two for some purposes and extra-Code law
(such as the law of agency or bailments) for others.3 4 Often it is
difficult to distinguish leases and consignments intended as se-
curity from those which are "true" in nature. This complex
issue and the important consequences that can turn on its reso-
lution are the subject of a voluminous legal literature and have
generated much litigation.3 5 Although they do not resolve all the
problems in this area, the 1972 Amendments would add two
provisions to the present Code that would clarify the existing
law in certain important respects.
The first provision can be illustrated through the following
example. Suppose Secured Party One (SPI) obtains a perfected
security interest in all the debtor-appliance dealer's present and
after-acquired inventory of new and used home appliances. Sub-
" See generally Hawkland, Part IV, supra note 16, at 84.
32 See notes 353-61 infra and accompanying text.
3 See KRS §§ 355.1-201 (37), .9-102(2).
- See KRS §§ 355.1-103, 355.2-326. See Founders Inv. Corp. v. Fegett, 23 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (deemed sale or return provision of
KRS § 355.2-326(3) not applicable to individual owner-as distinguished from commer-
cial owner). A recent Kentucky case applied Article Two to an equipment lease. See
Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Joseph, 641 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
31 See, e.g., Diaz v. Goodwin Bros. Leasing, 511 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1974). See
generally Ayer, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IowA L. REv. 667
(1982-83); Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security
Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DuKE L.J. 909;
Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part V Consignments




sequently Secured Party Two (SP2) finances a new line of mi-
crowave ovens pursuant to what is actually a purchase money
security agreement drafted to resemble a consignment. At about
the same time Consignor (C) delivers several used refrigerators
to the dealer pursuant to a true consignment agreement.
Article Nine of the present Code specifies that SP2's dis-
guised security interest can have priority over SPI if SP2 com-
plies with a special rule applicable to purchase money security
interests in inventory.36 This rule requires that SP2 perfect his
or her security interest and notify SPI of its existence before the
debtor-appliance dealer receives possession of the new ovens.
These requirements are designed to prevent SPI from believing
that his or her security interest will enjoy priority in the new
line of inventory.
C's true consignment, on the other hand, is governed by
Article Two of the present UCC, which indicates that C can
protect the consigned goods against SPI's inventory security
interest by complying with Article Nine's "filing provisions. ' 37
However, it is unclear whether C is required to give notice to
SP1 comparable to that required of SP2. 38 The 1972 Amend-
ments would require that C give the same notice required from
SP2 in order to have priority over SP1. 39
As indicated above, it may also be difficult to distinguish
between true leases and leases intended as security. The latter
are actually secured sales which are subject to Article Nine of
the present UCC. In some instances, a transaction may inten-
tionally be structured to look as much as possible like a true
lease for tax or other reasons. On other occasions agreements
contain both lease and security agreement characteristics and the
parties may not be certain of the proper category even if they
consider the issue when structuring the agreement. The correct
316 See text accompanying notes 173-80 infra for a discussion of KRS § 335.9-
312(3).
37 See KRS § 355.2-326(3)(c). Compliance with the filing provisions of Article Nine
is normally the most practical of the available means for true consignors to insulate
consigned goods against the claims of the consignee's creditors. See KRS § 355.2-326(1)-
(3).
38 For divergent views on this issue see D. LEIBSON & R. NoWvKA, THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE OF KENTUCKY 659 (1983); Hawkland, Part V, supra note 35, at 111-
12.
31 See UCC § 9-114 (1972); Final Report, supra note 6, at 223.
1985]
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category typically comes into issue when a bankruptcy trustee
or some other third party argues that the transaction is subject
to Article Nine and is unperfected because no financing state-
ment was filed. Of course, a financing statement might be filed
to protect against this eventuality. But such a filing is a two-
edged sword under the present Code. It might be viewed as
evidence that the agreement is a secured sale with the result that
all of Article Nine becomes relevant. 40 This includes the Article
Nine security agreement and financing statement formalities,
default provisions, and other regulatory rules. The 1972 Amend-
ments are intendpd to protect a protective filer from being pen-
alized for being cautious. The Amendments expressly authorize
protective filings and prohibit the existence of such a filing from
being a factor in deciding whether Article Nine is applicable. 41
This provision for protective filings is also applicable to con-
signment transactions .42
C. Classifying the Collateral
The present Code contains a set of classifications for collat-
eral subject to security interests. 43 Placing the collateral into the
proper classification can be essential to correctly resolving a host
of practical questions ranging from how to describe collateral in
the security agreement or financing statement to determining a
secured party's rights upon the debtor's default. 44 For the most
part, enactment of the 1972 Amendments would not affect this
classification scheme. However, it would result in an important
change with respect to the classification of certain intangible
rights .45
Suppose that a business sells widgets from inventory. When
the company accepts a widget purchase order from a buyer, the
company's resulting intangible rights under the sale agreement
- See KRS § 355.1-201(37). Such a conclusion might have unfortunate tax and
financial statement implications. See generally R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-12 (2d ed. 1978).
-1 See UCC § 9-408 (1972).
41 See id.
" See KRS §§ 355.9-105, .9-106, .9-109.
44 See D. BAKER, A LAWYER'S BASIC GUIDE TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 1-5
(1983).
4 See UCC § 9-106 (1972).
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would be characterized by the present Code as a "contract right"
which is "any right to payment under a contract not yet earned
by performance.''"4 When the sale agreement is performed, the
company's intangible rights evolve into an "account." The latter
classification applies under the present Code to "any right to
payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered.'' 47
This approach creates a misclassification pitfall for practi-
tioners because it is not always clear when the "performance"
that gives rise to the account has occurred.4 8 This may result in
an incorrect collateral description in the security agreement or
financing statement and can lead to proceeds and priority ques-
tions.49 Moreover, these difficulties are unnecessary because the
contract right concept is of virtually no significance in the pres-
" KRS § 355.9-106. See Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Fenton Rigging
Co., 522 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1975) (applying definition of "contract right"); Spurlin v.
Sloan, 368 S.W.2d 314.
- KRS § 355.9-106.
" See 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 194; FiN.A REPORT, supra note 6, at
214-16.
, Examples illustrating these problems are contained in D. BAKER, supra note 44,
§ l-5(c)(1)(a), at 55-56 n.209:
Assume, for instance, that on Day I Creditor 1 files a financing statement
listing only "accounts" as collateral. On Day 2, Creditor 2 files a financing
statement claiming "contract rights and proceeds." The contract in ques-
tion calls for delivery of goods by the debtor-manufacturer to a buyer. If
the priority conflict between Creditor 1 and Creditor 2 arises on Day 4 (by
virtue of the debtor's default at that point) prior to delivery, it is uncertain
whether Creditor 1, having referred only to "accounts" in his financing
statement, has any claim to what is arguably still a "contract right" to
future payment.
Or suppose the conflict arises on Day 6, after the debtor has delivered,
earned the right to payment, and thereby clearly created an account. On
the one hand, it can be argued that Creditor 1 should win under 1962
Section 9-312(5)(a) because he filed first as to "accounts"-the type of
collateral now in controversy. On the other hand, it can be argued that
Creditor 2 should prevail, on the following reasoning: Section 9-306(1) of
the 1962 Code defines "proceeds" to include "the account arising when
the right to payment is earned under a contract right." Moreover, under
the 1962 Code, the first-to-file rule of Section 9-312(5)(a) does not clearly
govern priority with respect to proceeds; priority might be based on who
perfected first. If the latter is true, Creditor 2 perfected first by virtue of
having a continuously perfected interest in the accounts as proceeds dating
back to his filing on the original collateral (contract rights) on Day 2. 1962
UCC § 9-306(3). And under 1962 Section 9-204(2)(d), Creditor l's security
interest did not attach and thus did not become perfected until the account
"came into existence" on Day 5
(original emphasis).
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ent Code's scheme-of-things.50 The 1972 Amendments would
eliminate this source of uncertainty by eliminating contract rights
as a collateral classification and by defining account to mean
"any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered . .. whether or not it has been earned by perform-
ance. "i5
While this amendment is justified in the name of clarity and
simplification, it should be noted that its enactment would alter
the correct classification for some collateral in certain instances.
For example, under the present UCC the right to payment for
services to be performed in the future is a contract right.5 2 Under
the 1972 Amendments, it would be an account.5 3 Or consider a
tenant's right to the future return of a security deposit pursuant
to the terms of a written lease. The present Code may charac-
terize this asset as a contract right.5 4 Under the 1972 Amend-
ments, it would fall into the residual category of "general
intangibles. ' '55
Another collateral classification problem relates to money.
Money can be proceeds of original collateral (such as when
inventory is sold for cash) and might also serve as original
collateral (such as in the case of a security interest in coins or
currency of numismatic value).56 The present Code leaves open
the possibility that money might be classified as a general intan-
gible.5 7 Security interests in general intangibles can be perfected
by filing. 8 This makes no sense in the case of money, the most
negotiable of personalty. The 1972 Amendments would specify
" Although utilized in several places, the definition of contract right was used to
contrast with the concept of account in only one Article Nine provision. This section
was redrafted to eliminate its dependence on this definition. See UCC § 9-318 (1972);
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 215.
11 See UCC § 9-106 (1972).
52 See KRS § 355.9-106.
" See UCC § 9-106 (1972).
11 See R. HENSON, supra note 40, at 168 n.44.
55 UCC § 9-106 (1972) (any personal property (including things in action), other
than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments and money).
See KRS § 355.9-306(l).
Id. See generally R. HENSON, supra note 40, at 102 n.9.
See KRS § 355.9-302(1).
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that money is not a general intangible and that a security interest
in money can be perfected only by taking possession.
5 9
D. Attachment, Enforceability, and Perfection of Security
Interests
Attachment, enforceability, and perfection are independent
but interrelated concepts under the present Code. The statutory
language dealing with these concepts would be modified by
enactment of the 1972 Amendments in several ways.
"Attachment" describes the requirements that must be sat-
isfied in order for personalty to become collateral subject to a
security interest. 6° These requirements are that there be an agree-
ment that the security interest attach, that value be given, and
that the debtor have rights in the collateral. 61 The present UCC
also provides a set of rules indicating when a debtor obtains
rights in collateral. 62 It specifies, for example, that the debtor
has no rights in an account until it comes into existence and no
rights in fish until they are caught. 63
The present Code's "enforceability" provision is in the na-
ture of a statute of frauds. A security interest is not enforceable
against the debtor or third parties (such as other secured credi-
tors of the debtor) unless either the debtor has signed a written
security agreement meeting certain formal requirements or the
collateral is in the possession of the secured party.6
"Perfection" can take place only when the security interest
has attached and relates to the additional steps that a secured
59 See UCC §§ 9-106, 9-304(1), 9-305 (1972). See also FINAL REPORT, supra note
6, at 213. See notes 130-50 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of proceeds
under UCC § 9-306(3)(b) (1972).
The correct classification for money would remain somewhat problematic. It is not
"goods" under either the present UCC or the 1972 Amendments. See KRS §§ 355.1-
201(24), .9-105(0; UCC § 9-105(h) (1972). It may be classified as "instruments" with
some definitional twisting and tugging. See generally 1C BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERVICE (MB) § 23.09 (1984). Some Article Nine provisions expressly apply to
money, obviating the need for classification. See, e.g., UCC § 9-306(1) (1972).
10 See generally R. HENSON, supra note 40, at 57-60.
61 See KRS § 355.9-204(1).
62 See KRS § 355.9-204(2).
63 Id.
See KRS § 355.9-203(1). See generally Weinberg, Toward Maximum Facilitation
of Intent to Create Enforceable Article Nine Security Interests, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REv. 1 (1976).
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party must take in order to insulate its claim to the collateral
against third parties. 5 Depending on the nature of the secured
transaction, the additional steps (if any) required for perfection
may consist of filing a financing statement or secured party
possession of the collateral. 66
The 1972 Amendments would cure an anomaly that exists in
the present Code.67 It is currently possible for a security interest
to have attached and become perfected even though it is unen-
forceable for lack of a written security agreement .6  The 1972
Amendments would remedy this by integrating the requirements
for attachment and enforceability in order that a security interest
can never be perfected before it is enforceable under the Article
Nine statute of frauds.6 9
The 1972 Amendments also would eliminate the present
Code's special attachment rules on the grounds that they are
arbitrary, sometimes confusing or superfluous, and because the
issue of when the debtor has rights in the collateral is best left
to the courts.7 0 Actually, this issue was not removed from the
courts by the present Code. Rather, it is framed in different
terms. For example, there seems to be little difference between
asking when an account comes into existence and asking whether
the debtor has rights in the account.71 Nor is anything important
gained from the present Code's specification that the debtor has
no rights in an uncaught fish.
Other 1972 Amendments to the present UCC's treatment of
attachment, enforceability and perfection relate to topics includ-
ing proceeds, agricultural and mineral finance, and multistate
See KRS § 355.9-303(1).
See KRS §§ 355.9-302, .9-304, .9-305.
67 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 217.
61 For a contrast of the requirements for each of these concepts, see text accom-
panying notes 60-66 supra.
- See UCC §§ 9-203, 9-204 (1972).
70 See UCC § 9-203 (1972); 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 200. See also
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 217-18. Deletion of the special rule that the debtor has
no rights in timber until cut conforms to the proposed treatment of timber as goods.
See notes 364-66 infra and accompanying text.
71 The 1972 Amendments also eliminated the special attachment rule for accounts
because of voidable preference problems it created in bankruptcy. See R. HENSON, supra
note 40, at § 4-2. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 subsequently amended the
preference rules. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
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transactions. These modifications are considered in those con-
texts.72
E. Filing and Financing Statements
Filing a financing statement is the most frequently employed
means of perfecting a security interest. Part four of Article Nine
of the present Code contains detailed provisions regulating the
content, place, duration and administrative handling of filings. 73
Several changes of varying degrees of significance would result
from enactment of the 1972 Amendments. 74
1. Content
The present Code's rule for the content of a financing state-
ment requires the debtor's name.75 This is a crucial piece of
information because financing statements are indexed by debtor
name. 76 An unresolved question under the present Code is
whether, in filings against sole proprietorships, it is permissible
to use a trade name (Lauren's Computer Shoppe) instead of the
proprietor's individual name (Lauren Ruth). The 1972 Amend-
ments would require the individual's proper name and permit
the adding of a trade name.77 The relevant amendment also
would make clear that in the case of a partnership debtor, the
partnership name must be used and the names of individual
partners or trade names may be added at the secured party's
option. 78 This amendment's rationale is that trade names are too
uncertain to serve as a basis for indexing the filing system.79
However, it should be noted that another 1972 Amendment
permits optional trade name indexing. 0
71 For a discussion of these modifications, see notes 130-50 infra and accompanying
text (proceeds); notes 367-83 infra and accompanying text (agricultural finance); notes
353-66 infra and accompanying text (mineral finance); notes 384-515 infra and accom-
panying text (multistate transactions).
73 See KRS §§ 355.9-401 to 406.
1, See generally Haydock, The Improved Filing Rules Proposed by the Review
Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 Bus. LAW. 1163 (1971).
75 See KRS § 355.9-402.
76 See KRS § 355.9-403(4).
- See UCC § 9-402(7) (1972). See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 245-46.
See UCC § 9-402(7) (1972).
7 See UCC § 9-402 comment 7 (1972).
" See UCC § 9-403(5) (1972).
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A related problem under the present Code is the lack of a
rule applicable to debtors' name changes and to changes in
business form (such as when a subsidiary corporation is merged
into its parent). The 1972 Amendments would supply a rule
applicable both to name changes and to changes in the identity
or structure of an organization.8' If the previously filed financing
statement becomes seriously misleading as a result of the change,
the filing will not be effective to perfect a security interest in
collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after
the change unless a new financing statement is filed prior to
expiration of the four month period.82 The original filing would
continue to perfect collateral acquired by the debtor prior to the
end of the four month period.83 The "seriously misleading"
standard is already used in the present UCC.84 Compliance with
this new provision would be facilitated by the enactment of
another 1972 Amendment which authorizes the secured party
alone to sign the subsequent financing statement.85
Sometimes collateral is transferred by the debtor (A) to
another person (B). The transfer may or may not be authorized
by the secured party and B may or may not assume A's secured
obligation. The present Code provides that the security interest
will continue in the transferred collateral unless the transfer was
authorized. 6 A 1972 Amendment would add the corollary that
a filed financing statement covering the collateral remains effec-
tive after the transfer whether or not the secured party knew of
or consented to it.87 A secured party is thus under no statutory
obligation to learn of the transfer. (Of course, this information
81 See UCC § 9-402(7) (1972). "Organization" is defined by a provision in the
present Code (that would not be altered by the 1972 Amendments) to include, inter alia,
corporations and partnerships. See KRS § 355.1-201(28).
82 UCC § 9-402(7) (1972). See also FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 246.
UCC § 9-402 comment 7 (1972).
See KRS § 355.9-402(6).
See UCC § 9-402(2)(d) (1972). This amendment also would authorize financing
statements signed only by the secured party that are filed to perfect security interests in
collateral for which the filing has lapsed or when the debtor's location has changed. See
UCC § 9-402(2) (1972).
See KRS § 355.9-306(2), which was applied in J.I. Case Co. v. Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp., 669 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). The secured party also may be
"cut off" by a priority rule. See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
- See UCC § 9-402(7) (1972). This amendment should not be read to reverse by
implication the rule in the present Code that a security interest will be terminated by
secured party consent. See D. BAKER, supra note 44, at 108.
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may be of critical, practical import.) Nor is the secured party
required to file against the transferee. Third persons interested
in the state of B's title, such as potential purchasers, theoretically
would be obligated to check the record for any security interests
in the property previously granted by A as well as for any
granted by B. However, this burden may not be as great as it
first may appear. Third persons may be protected against the
security interest pursuant to the present Code's priority rules
even though the filing against A technically remains effective
after the transfer. 88 Moreover, this amendment would not make
a filing against A effective against B for assets acquired by B
from sources other than A. This is so even if the assets are
collateral subject to an after-acquired property clause in a se-
curity agreement entered into by A and subsequently assumed
by B. 89
The present Code requires the signatures of both the secured
party and the debtor on the financing statement. 90 The 1972
Amendments eliminate the former requirement because it was
thought to serve no useful purpose and might sometimes inval-
idate an otherwise sufficient filing.91 An additional reason sup-
porting this change may be found in the present Code's lack of
an express requirement that the secured party's signature appear
on the security agreement creating the security interest. 92 A re-
lated 1972 Amendment would require the signatures of both the
secured party and the debtor on amendments to financing state-
ments. This limited dual-signature requirement is intended to
preclude the possibility that either party could prejudice the
other's rights. 93
2. Place of Filing
The present Code's filing section contains three specific rules
specifying the correct place to file a financing statement under
See generally D. BAKER, supra note 44, at 108 n.68.
89 See FNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 246.
See KRS § 355.9-402(1).
, See UCC § 9-402(1) (1972). See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 151-52.
Kentucky precedent indicates that the absence of the secured party's signature does not
necessarily invalidate a financing statement. See Riley v. Miller, 549 S.W.2d 314 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977); Alloway v. Stuart, 385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1964).
92 See KRS § 355.9-203(1)(b); text accompanying note 64 supra.
11 See UCC § 9-402(4) and comment 4 (1972).
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various circumstances. 94 Two of the rules are primarily applicable
to farming related collateral and fixtures. 95 The third rule applies
to all other types of collateral for which filing is a permissible
means of perfection (such as industrial equipment or a mer-
chant's inventory or accounts). 96 Depending on the facts, it calls
for filing in the county of the debtor's "residence" or the county
of the debtor's "principal place of business." 97 Interpretative
case law provides some guidance as to the meaning of residence
and principal place of business in the case of business debtors. 98
Both the filing provision and the case law have been a source
of criticism.9
This language in Kentucky's present Code must be contrasted
with the ALI & NCCUSL 1962 Official Text. The 1962 text calls
for certain filings in the county of the debtor's residence or place
of business and differs in other ways from the current Code."°
- See KRS § 355.9-401.
91 See notes 277-79 infra and accompanying text. KRS § 355.9-401(1)(a) also applies
to consumer goods. These present Code rules are the same as those contained in the
uniform text of the Code prior to the 1972 Amendments. See UCC § 9-401(1)(a), (b)
second and third alternative subsections (1) (1962).
- See KRS § 355.9-401(l)(c), which provides:
The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(c) In all other cases, if the debtor is a resident of this state in the
office of the county clerk in the county of the debtor's residence, if
the debtor is not a resident of this state but has a principal place of
business in this state, in the office of the county clerk in the county
where the nonresident has a principal place of business, if the debtor
is a nonresident of this state and has no principal place of business in
this state then in the office of the secretary of state of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky....
97 Id.
" See National Cash Register Co. v. K.W.C., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Ky.
1977); In re Page, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 250 (W.D. Ky. 1968).
" The history of this provision and the problem of applying it to business debtors
are described in Whiteside, supra note 4, at 8-9. For criticisms see D. LEMSON & R.
NowKA, supra note 38, at § 8.3(c)(2); Fitzgerald, The Crazy Quilt of Commercial Law:
A Study of Legislative Patchwork, 54 Ky. L.J. 85, 87 (1965-66).
101 For example, see UCC § 9-401(1) (1962) third alternative subsection (1), which
provides:
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as
follows:
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State] and in
addition, if the debtor has a place of business in only one county of
this state, also in the office of ...... of such county, or, if the
debtor has no place of business in this state, but resides in the state,
also in the office of ...... of the county in which he resides.
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A 1972 Amendment, tailored to mesh with this official language,
would specify that the residence of an organization is its "place
of business" if it has one or its "chief executive office" if it
has more than one place of business. 10' It is apparent that
enactment of this 1972 Amendment could confuse what already
is a troublesome Kentucky filing rule.
The present Code contains two nonuniform provisions that
anticipate the 1972 Amendments. One exempts from Article
Nine's filing provisions security interests created by specified
utilities engaged in the electric, water, telephone, gas pipeline
and other businesses. 02 These security interests can be perfected
only by recording in accordance with a special statute, applicable
to public utility mortgages, which authorizes filing in the county
of the utility's principal office. 03 The second provision indicates
that it is not necessary to file a financing statement to perfect a
security interest in the realty or personalty of any public utility
corporation or railroad that is "recorded and filed" pursuant to
the applicable provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.' 4
The apparent purpose of these exemptions is to avoid the mul-
tiple-county filings that otherwise would be required under the
present Code. One can understand this purpose by imagining
the numerous filings necessary to perfect a security interest in a
railroad's poles, signals and other chattels that are affixed to,
or otherwise associated with, its multicounty realty holdings.
The 1972 Amendments deal with the same problem by designat-
ing certain debtors "transmitting utilities" and authorizing cen-
tral filing in the Secretary of State's office as the exclusive means
for perfecting security interests in their collateral." °5
3. Duration
The present Code provides that a filed financing statement
is effective for five years from the date of filing.'( Excepted are
101 See UCC § 9-401(6) (1972). This amendment originated out of uncertainty
concerning the residence of corporate farms. See FNAL. REPORT, supra note 6, at 209-
10.
" See KRS § 355.9-302(5).
'0' KRS § 382.340.
'o, See KRS § 355.9-302(I)(g).
105 See UCC §§ 9-105(1)(n), 9-401(5) (1972). See generally FNAL REPORT, supra
note 6, at 243.
I6 See KRS § 355.9-403(2).
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financing statements with a stated maturity date of the obligation
secured of five years or less.107 These financing statements are
effective until the maturity date plus sixty days.108 As one might
anticipate, financing statements with maturity dates are few and
far between. For this reason, the 1972 Amendments would elim-
inate the exception with the result that all financing statements
would be effective for five years. 109
The present Code provides that upon the expiration of a
financing statement (and absent the prior filing of a continuation
statement) the filing lapses and the security interest becomes
unperfected. 110 Enactment of the 1972 Amendments would make
it clear that a lapse will not result in nonperfection if the security
interest is perfected without filing, a result that is implied in the
present Code."' This would protect a secured party who had
taken possession of collateral (perhaps upon the debtor's default)
which can be the subject of a possessory security interest such
as goods or instruments." 2 It also would save security interests
that are automatically perfected such as a purchase money se-
curity interest in consumer goods." 3
A special problem, for which the present Code has no certain
answer, arises when a financing statement expires during the
course of bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings." 4 The
cases do not agree on whether the secured party's perfected
status at the commencement of the insolvency proceeding is
frozen so that a timely continuation statement is not required
for the security interest to remain perfected during the proceed-
ing."15 The 1972 Amendments would provide the rule that if a
filing expires during insolvency proceedings, the security interest
lo, See id.
Io Id.
See UCC § 9-403(2) (1972); FNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 243. The amendments
would permit a longer effective period in the case of real estate mortgages that constitute
fixture security interests and transmitting utilities. See UCC § 9-403(6) (1972).
1,0 KRS § 355.9-403(2).
M See UCC § 9-403(2) (1972). This result is implied in KRS § 355.9-303(2).
112 See KRS § 355.9-305.
13 See KRS § 9-302(1)(d); UCC § 9-302(1)(d) (1972). The secured party might have
filed to avoid being "cut off" under KRS § 355.9-307(5). See UCC § 9-307(2) (1972).
"1 See KRS § 355.1-201(22) (definition of "insolvency proceedings").




remains perfected until sixty days after the proceeding is termi-
nated.1 6
The 1972 Amendments also expressly deal with the effect of
a lapsed financing statement on the outcome of priority disputes,
another topic about which the present Code is unclear.11 7 For
example, suppose Secured Party (SP) perfects a security interest
in one of Debtor's pieces of equipment by filing. Subsequently,
Creditor (CR) obtains a judgment lien on the same equipment.
Then SP's filing lapses and becomes unperfected because of the
expiration of five years. SP clearly had priority over CR before
the lapse under the present Code." 8 After the lapse, the 1972
Amendments would deem SP to be unperfected against persons
who became lien creditors before the lapse." 9 CR also would
prevail over SP if CR were a purchaser (which includes a secured
party).12
The proper way to avoid a lapse under the present Code is
by filing a continuation statement.' 2 ' The 1972 Amendments add
the requirement that a continuation statement signed by a person
other than the secured party (such as an assignee) be accom-
panied by a written statement of assignment that meets specified
requirements including the signature of the secured party of
record. 22
The 1972 Amendments relating to termination statements
present another instance in which the Kentucky General Assem-
bly anticipated the ALI and NCCUSL. Under the present Code,
the secured party is required to send the debtor a termination
statement upon demand by the debtor. 23 There is no obligation
to file the statement. This provision is very similar to the lan-
guage contained in the ALL and NCCUSL 1962 Official Text
prior to the 1972 Amendments. 24 However, the present Code
116 UCC § 9-403(2) (1972). See 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 241.
" See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 244-45.
's KRS § 355.9-301(I)(b).
.9 See UCC § 9-403(2) (1972).
W See UCC § 9-403(2) (1972). "Purchaser" would include a person who acquires
a security interest. See KRS § 355.1-201(32) to (33).
121 See KRS § 355.9-403(3).
M See UCC § 9-403(3) (1972). Similar requirements are added for the release of
collateral and termination statements. See UCC §§ 9-404, 9-406 (1972).
22 See KRS § 355.9-404(l).
' See UCC § 9-404(1) (1962).
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contains a nonuniform exception which leaves little of the uni-
form rule. In the absence of a demand for a termination state-
ment, and within fifteen days after the secured transaction has
terminated, the secured party must send a termination statement
to the county clerk for filing. 125 Willful noncompliance with this
requirement can cost the secured party twenty-five dollars plus
the amount of any loss caused to the debtor. 2 6 A 1972 Amend-
ment places a similar affirmative obligation on creditors claiming
security interests in consumer goods. 127
4. Administration
The 1972 Amendments contain several provisions relevant to
the administrative details of operating a filing system. For ex-
ample, they would authorize county clerks to charge an extra
fee for filings not made on a standard form.'2 Another amend-
ment would require clerks to annex financing statements to
continuation statements in order to preserve those financing
statements which have been given continued vitality. 129
F. Proceeds
1. Creating and Perfecting Security Interests in Proceeds
The present Code permits a secured party to claim a security
interest in "original collateral" (such as inventory) and the "pro-
ceeds" thereof (such as cash generated by the sale of the inven-
tory).130 Perhaps surprisingly, uncertainty exists under the present
statutory language as to whether it is necessary to expressly refer
to proceeds in a security agreement in order to have a proceeds
claim.' 31 The 1972 Amendments would resolve the question by
providing that, unless otherwise agreed, the security agreement
'- See KRS § 355.9-404(2). See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Gibson, 566 S.W.2d 154
(Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (provision does not require notice of termination to debtor).
12 KRS § 355.9-404(2).
'' See UCC § 9-404(1) (1972). The 1972 Amendment provides for an arguably
more realistic penalty of $100 plus damages. See id.
See UCC §§ 9-403(5), 9-404(3) (1972). Cf. KRS §§ 64.012, 355.9-403(5).
See UCC § 9-403(3) (1972).
' See KRS § 355.9-306.
131 See Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC Part II:
Proceeds, 77 CoM. L.J. 12, 16 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hawkland, Part I1]; FnAL.
REPORT, supra note 6, at 218. Compare KRS § 355.9-203(1)(b) with KRS § 355.9-306(2).
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covers proceeds. 3 2 This assumption that the parties intended the
security interest to extend to proceeds is probably correct in the
great majority of cases. For similar reasons, a cognate 1972
Amendment would eliminate the present UCC's requirement that
financing statements refer to proceeds if they are claimed by the
secured creditor. 33 Such claims are so routine that some com-
mercial financing statement forms come with a preprinted pro-
ceeds designation. 3 4
Under the present Code, a proceeds claim may encompass
whatever is received when original collateral or proceeds is sold,
exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of. 35 This broad
definition includes what might be called first generation proceeds
(such as the cash or accounts resulting from the sale of business
inventory that is original collateral) and second generation pro-
ceeds (such as a video cassette recorder purchased with the cash
for personal use in the debtor's home). Subsequent generations
are also included within the definition. 3 6 The 1972 Amendments
would clarify this definition by specifying that insurance payable
to the debtor or secured party by reason of loss or damage to
the collateral is proceeds, an issue upon which the courts have
split. 137
It is clear in light of this expansive definition of proceeds
that third parties who search for UCC filings against a particular
person may learn little when they discover a financing statement,
whether or not it mentions "proceeds." This problem is illus-
trated by the example in the immediately preceeding paragraph.
A file searcher can be expected to understand that cash or
accounts often are first generation proceeds of inventory. But it
132 See UCC § 9-203(3) (1972). Wise counsel still might insert a reference to proceeds
to counter the argument that they were not intended to be included. There was some
discussion of whether the 1972 Amendments' automatic proceeds claim would run afoul
of the Bankruptcy Act. See Hawkland, Part II, supra note 131, at 16. There is less
reason for concern after passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (1982).
"I Compare UCC §§ 9-306(3), 9-402(3) (1972) with KRS §§ 355.9-306(3), .9-402(4).
114 See FaMA REPORT, supra note 6, at 219.
M' The account that arises when the right to payment is earned under a contract
right is also included. See KRS § 355.9-306(1).
"6 See FitNi REPORT, supra note 6, at 220. The present UCC limits the ability to
actually recover proceeds both through its requirement that proceeds be "identifiable"
and through its priority rules. See KRS §§ 355.9-306(2), .9-312(1).
"3 See UCC § 9-306(1) (1972). See generally R. HENSON, supra note 40, at § 6-8.
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is unlikely that someone deciding whether to make a loan against
the video cassette recorder would realize that it is subject to a
security interest taken by an earlier secured party in "inventory
and proceeds."
A comparable problem results from the present Code's rule
that a security interest in proceeds is continuously perfected if
the interest in the original collateral was perfected by a filed
financing statement covering the original collateral and also men-
tioning proceeds. 138 Suppose that a security agreement and prop-
erly filed financing statement cover "inventory and proceeds"
and that the debtor exchanges some of the inventory for a
promissory note due in six months. The present Code arguably
gives the secured party a perfected interest in the note as pro-
ceeds even though the Code very definitely specifies possession
as the means for perfecting a security interest in notes as original
collateral.' 39 This problem of inappropriate means of perfection
also exists for proceeds that may be perfected by filing. Suppose
that the inventory is located in Kentucky and that the debtor
maintains computer records at its Ohio corporate headquarters
relating to accounts generated by the sale of the inventory. The
present Code's filing and choice of law rules indicate that the
proper place to file for the inventory is in Kentucky, but that a
filing for accounts as original collateral should be in Ohio. 40
However, the proceeds provision seems to suggest that the Ken-
tucky filing is sufficient for the accounts as proceeds.' 4' Many
of the proceeds-related 1972 Amendments deal with these sorts
of problems.
The 1972 Amendments would require a financing statement
to be more descriptive when it is intended to cover second and
subsequent generations of proceeds. This is accomplished in two
steps. First, the amendments specify that money, checks, check-
' See KRS § 355.9-306(3)(a). The secured party has a 10-day grace period after
the debtor's receipt of the proceeds to perfect as to the proceeds if they were not claimed
in the filing for the original collateral. See KRS § 355.9-306(3)(b).
139 See KRS § 355.9-304 (also provides two narrow exceptions to the possession
requirement).
I- See KRS §§ 355.9-102(1), .9-103(1). See generally Coogan, supra note 12, at
515. Concerning the 1972 Amendments of the choice-of-law rules, see text accompanying
notes 384-515 infra.
14 See KRS § 355.9-306(3).
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ing accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds.' '1 42 Second, they
provide that in order to perfect a security interest in proceeds
acquired with cash proceeds, the financing statement must in-
dicate the types of proceeds claimed. 143 The rationale is that
most file searchers understand that a financing statement refer-
ence to "proceeds" includes cash proceeds which typically result
from the disposition of original collateral. However, there is less
certainty concerning what may have been acquired if the cash
proceeds were exchanged by the debtor for other assets. Thus,
under the 1972 Amendments, a security interest in a home video
cassette recorder acquired for the debtor's personal use with
cash proceeds from the sale of inventory will not be perfected
unless the financing statement specifies that the proceeds claimed
include consumer goods. 44
The 1972 Amendments would also make certain that the
means for perfecting a security interest in proceeds is appropriate
for the type of proceeds involved. Under these amendments (with
two exceptions described below), a security interest in proceeds
can be perfected only by the methods or under the circumstances
permitted for original collateral of the same type. 145 Thus, a
security interest in a promissory note claimed as proceeds can
be perfected only through possession; filing is not sufficient. If
the proceeds consist of a type of collateral for which filing is
appropriate, then the financing statement must be filed in the
correct office for that type of property.146
These 1972 Amendments may have the effect of requiring
secured parties to give additional thought to the identity of the
proceeds that they intend to claim in order to properly perfect.
This is appropriate given the present Code's strong policy of
1,2 See UCC §§ 9-306(1), 9-105(l)(e), 9-104(1) (1972).
" See UCC § 9-306(3)(a) (1972). The present UCC permits original collateral to
be described by type in financing statements. See KRS § 355.9-402(1). Concerning the
meaning of this provision and the cognate security agreement description, see, e.g., In
re Cooley, 624 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1980).
"4 See UCC § 9-306(3)(a) (1972); KRS § 355.9-109(1) (definition of consumer
goods). The 1972 Amendments would not help the file searcher in unusual barter
transactions where original collateral (such as inventory) is traded for noncash proceeds
(such as a home video cassette recorder) without intermediary cash proceeds. See id.
' UCC § 9-306(3) (1972). See also FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 213, 219.
UCC § 9-306(3)(a) (1972). See also FiNAL REPoRT, supra note 6, at 219.
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placing third parties on notice. 147 However, the amendments may
not affect many secured parties for two reasons. First, a security
interest in identifiable cash proceeds (often the most important
type of proceeds) will be perfected so long as the security interest
in the original collateral is perfected by a filed financing state-
ment. 148 Second, a secured party claiming proceeds will have a
ten day grace period that begins to run upon the debtor's receipt
of the proceeds. 149 During this period, the security interest in
proceeds will be temporarily perfected if it was perfected for the
original collateral. The secured party would have continuous
perfection as to the proceeds if any required additional filing or
if possession were accomplished during this period. 50
2. Proceeds-Related Priority Rules
The present Code contains a curious priority-related anom-
aly. Suppose that SPI takes and perfects a security interest in
the debtor's "inventory and proceeds." Debtor then sells one
item of inventory on credit to a buyer who executes chattel paper
evidencing the buyer's monetary obligation and a security inter-
est in the purchased goods.' 5' Another item of inventory is sold
on credit to the same buyer who executes a negotiable note. The
debtor then uses the chattel paper and note as collateral for a
loan from SP2. SP1 claims the chattel paper and note as pro-
ceeds and SP2 claims the same assets as original collateral.
Which secured party has priority?
The present Code awards the chattel paper to SP2 if SP2
took possession of the paper in the ordinary course of business
", Cf. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Fancher, 600 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(Kentucky appellate courts have frequently emphasized the notice requirements of the
Code).
I- See UCC § 9-306(3)(b) (1972).
149 UCC § 9-306(3)(c) (1972). KRS § 355.9-401(1) provides for a local filing in the
county of the debtor's residence in many cases. This also may have the effect of reducing
the instances in which a second filing is necessary to perfect a security interest in
proceeds.
See UCC § 9-306(3)(c) (1972).
' Chattel paper is defined at KRS § 355.9-105(1)(b):
"Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a mon-
etary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods.
When a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a
lease and by an instrument or a series of instruments, the group of writings
taken together constitutes chattel paper. ...
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and gave new value. 15 2 It does not matter whether SP2 knew of
SP I's claim to the chattel paper.Y3 Surprisingly, this same knowl-
edge would result in the note being awarded to SP1 under a
different priority rule for instrumentsY.4 The effect of these rules
is to make chattel paper more negotiable than negotiable instru-
ments, a result generally not contemplated by the present Code
or demanded by commercial practice or policy. 55 The 1972
Amendments would cure this anomaly by applying the same
priority rule to both types of collateral and awarding priority in
both to SP2.156
The present Code is also unclear on the outcome of the
dispute that results when one secured party claims accounts as
the proceeds of inventory and another secured party claims the
same accounts as original collateral.5 7 Suppose SP1 takes a
properly perfected security interest in accounts. Then SP2 ob-
tains a properly perfected purchase money security interest in
inventory and proceeds. Does SPI, as the first to file for the
accounts, take priority over SP2's claim to accounts that are
proceeds of the inventory? 5 8 Or, does SP2's special purchase
money priority for the inventory (that would enable it to defeat
a prior inventory financer) "carry-through" to the accounts? 59
The 1972 Amendments would extend this purchase money prior-
ity in inventory only to identifiable cash proceeds received by
152 See KRS § 355.9-308, which was recently applied in J.I. Case Co. v. Borg-
Warner Acceptance Corp., 669 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
See KRS § 355.9-308.
See KRS §§ 355.9-309, .3-302. (SP2 could not meet the requirements for holding
in due course and, thus, could not achieve priority under these circumstances).
155 For example, a security interest in a negotiable instrument can be perfected only
by possession (with two narrow exceptions), whereas a security interest in chattel paper
may be perfected by filing. See KRS § 355.9-304(1). Concerning the policies underlying
negotiability, see Weinberg, Commercial Paper in Economic Theory and Legal History,
70 Ky. L.J. 567 (1981-82).
-- See UCC § 9-308(b) (1972). The qualifying purchaser of an instrument might
also be entitled to priority pursuant to KRS § 355.9-309. See note 154 supra and
accompanying text. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 214.
1' This problem has received much attention in the commercial law literature and
various approaches have been suggested. See generally R. HENSON, supra note 40, at §
6-5; D. LEBSON & R. NowKA, supra note 38, at 787-88.
"I See KRS § 355.9-312(5)(a).
159 See KRS § 355.9-312(3). A purchase money secured party is one that finances
the debtor's acquisition of the collateral. See KRS § 355.9-107.
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the debtor on or before delivery of the inventory to a buyer.' 60
Thus, SP 1 would prevail as the first to file. 161 This new rule was
arrived at after consideration of several alternatives and is based
upon economic and commercial aspects of accounts receivable
and inventory financing. 162 It should be noted that under this
amendment a secured party who properly files as to inventory
and proceeds would take priority over another secured creditor
who subsequently files as to accounts.' 63 Thus, a financer who
files first for inventory and proceeds can be assured of priority
over an accounts financer.
Although, under the 1972 Amendments, a purchase money
priority in inventory has a "carry-through" limited to narrowly
defined cash proceeds, other types of purchase money security
interests would reach all proceeds. 64 Thus, SP1, the accounts
financer in the above example, would lose if SP2 had been
secured in equipment and proceeds. The difference in result is
based upon the smaller probability that noninventory will be
sold or that the proceeds generated by such a sale would have
been relied upon as collateral by the prior secured party. 65
3. Other Proceeds Clarifications
The 1972 Amendments would improve the present UCC's
proceeds-related provisions in other respects. For example, the
present Code provides that a secured party with a claim to
proceeds is also entitled to recover the original collateral from
one who purchases the collateral from the debtor.' 66 A 1972
Amendment removes any question that the secured party can
follow the collateral into the hands of subsequent purchasers as
well. 167 The secured party will lose this right if the disposition
,' See UCC § 9-312(3) (1972). Concerning "cash proceeds," see note 142 supra
and accompanying text.
161 See UCC § 9-312(5)(a) (1972).
"I See 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 220; FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at
225-26. It also is supported by the first-in-time principle. See Hawkland, Part I, supra
note 131, at 20.
"6 Priority in this case is not controlled by the purchase money priority rule for
inventory. See UCC § 9-312(5)(a), (6) (1972).
I6 See UCC § 9-312(4) (1972).
165 See 1972 AmENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 221.
6 See KRS § 355.9-306(2).
,67 See UCC § 9-306(2) (1972).
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of the collateral by the debtor or any purchaser was authorized
by the secured party. 68 The 1972 Amendments also are intended
to improve the clarity of the present Code's provisions applicable
to proceeds claims in bankruptcy.' 69
G. Priorities
The present Code generally validates security agreements:
"Except as otherwise provided ... a security agreement is ef-
fective according to its terms . . . against purchasers of the
collateral and against creditors.' ' 70 Various priority rules provide
important exceptions to this general statement of validity.' 7' The
present Code's priority rules sometimes provide ambiguous an-
swers. Some of these problem areas and the "cures" that would
be provided by the 1972 Amendments have been discussed in
this Article's section on proceeds. 72 Others are covered in this
section.
1. Purchase Money Priority to Inventory
Suppose SPI perfects by filing a security interest in "all of
the debtor's inventory of radios, TVs, stereos, and all other
consumer appliances and electronics." Debtor then asks SP2 to
finance a new line of home computers. SP2, who may be the
seller of the computers or a lender, can have priority over SP1
by complying with the present Code's inventory purchase money
priority rule. 73 The rule requires, among other things, that SP2
give notice of his or her purchase money security interest to any
secured party (such as SP1) who has filed a financing statement
covering the relevant type of inventory and to any other person
whose security interest is known to SP2. 74 The notice must be
received by the persons entitled before the debtor receives pos-
session of the new computer inventory and must describe the
I" See id. It should be noted that priority rules may protect the purchasers. See,
e.g., KRS § 355.9-307.
169 Compare KRS § 355.9-306(4) with UCC § 9-306(4) (1972). No significant change
in substance was intended. See FINAL REPoRT, supra note 6, at 221.
,70 KRS § 355.9-201.
' See, e.g., KRS § 355.9-312(1).
,7 See notes 151-69 supra and accompanying text.
,73 See KRS §§ 355.9-312(3), .9-107.
I7 See KRS § 355.9-312(3)(b).
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new inventory by item or type. 75 The rule enables SP2 to have
priority and protects SPI against making advances in reliance
upon the new line of computers.
The present Code does not state how often this notice must
be given. The 19L72 Amendments would specify that the notice
is good for five years based upon an analogy to the duration of
financing statements. 7 6 Thus SP2 could give one notice to SPi
that would be effective both for the computers and for a new
line of microwave ovens financed by SP2 three years later.
The 1972 Amendments also would eliminate as superfluous
SP2's duty to give notice to prior secured parties who are known
to SP2 but who did not file financing statements.'7 7 SP2 can
defeat these prior parties as the first to file for the inventory
without the need for a purchase money priority.178
Under the 1972 Amendments, as under the present Code,
the deadline for giving and receiving notice is the time at which
the debtor receives possession of the goods. 179 However, the
present Code's inventory purchase money priority would be
modified in some other ways. For example, the required notice
to prior secured parties would have to be written. 80
2. The First-to-File and First-to-Perfect Rules
The present Code provides that between two non-purchase
money secured parties, priority is determined in the order of
filing if both are perfected by filing regardless of which security
interest attached first and whether it attached before or after
17S See KRS § 355.9-312(3)(b), (c).
17 See UCC § 9-312(3)(c) (1972); FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 221.
See UCC § 9-312(3)(b) (1972).
17 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 222. There also was concern that the failure
to give notice to prior but nonfiled secured parties might result in denial of the purchase
money priority despite the giving of notice to prior filed secured parties. See id. The
present Code's priority framework generally disregards notice or knowledge of prior
claims as an outcome-determinative factor in resolving priority disputes. See, e.g., KRS
§ 355.9-312(5)(a).
I" No change in these requirements was intended. See D. BAKER, supra note 44,
at 167-70.
'So See UCC § 9-312(3)(b) (1972). Of course, giving a written notice is a very good
idea under the present UCC. Other modifications would clarify the relationship between
KRS § 355.9-312(3) and KRS § 355.9-304(5). See UCC §§ 9-312(3)(b)(ii), 9-304(5)(a)




filing. 81 This is the first-to-file rule. If one of the security
interests is perfected by means other than filing, priority is
determined by the order of perfection. 82 This is the first-to-
perfect rule. The 1972 Amendments would modify the statutory
language of the two rules in order to deal with an inconsistency
that may be best illustrated through an example.
Suppose SPI files a financing statement describing certain
collateral owned by debtor. The financing statement meets all
the relevant formal requisites and is filed in the appropriate
place. Before anything else happens, SP2 enters into a security
agreement with debtor for the same collateral, gives value, and
properly files a legally sufficient financing statement. Then SPI
enters into a security agreement with the debtor describing the
collateral and gives value.
The present UCC's first-to-file rule makes SPI the victor in
a priority dispute with SP2.183 It is irrelevant that SP2's security
interest was the first to attach or to be perfected. However, this
outcome would be reversed if SP2 perfected by taking possession
of the collateral instead of filing. This is because the latter case
then is governed by the first-to-perfect rule. ' 4
The outcome in the latter case is inconsistent with the present
Code's notice filing system which expressly contemplates the
prefiling of financing statements by creditors who wish to be
assured of priority for an anticipated, but as yet unconsum-
mated, extension of secured credit. 85 SP2 was given constructive
notice of such a possible transaction between SPI and the debtor
through SPI's filing. This notice should have the same effect on
SP2's priority regardless of whether SP2 chooses to perfect by
filing or by taking possession. The 1972 Amendments would
repair this inconsistency and reverse the result in the latter case
by unifying the first-to-file and first-to-perfect rules to create a
is, See KRS § 355.9-312(5)(a).
'1 See KRS § 355.9-312(5)(b).
193 See KRS § 355.9-312(5)(a).
I" See KRS § 355.9-312(5)(b).
Is' See KRS §§ 355.9-402(l), .9-303(1).
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single rule that awards priority to the first secured party to file
or perfect. 86
3. Priority of Future Advances
Inventory and accounts receivable financings typically pro-
vide for future extensions of credit as the debtor's collateral
turns over and expands or contracts in value. Other types of
financing arrangements also may provide for multiple advances.
The present Code validates these financing patterns. 8 7 However,
it fails to address a number of priority-related issues that arise
when a secured creditor who has made a future advance com-
petes with some other person who also claims an interest in the
collateral.
One cause of uncertainty in the present Code is its failure to
distinguish between future advances that are optional at the
discretion of the secured lender and future advances that are
made pursuant to a contractual commitment. This distinction
necessarily must be a function of the contract terms which bind
or excuse the secured lender.'88 The 1972 Amendments provide
that "[a]n advance is made 'pursuant to commitment' if the
secured party has bound himself to make it."' 89 The advance
will be pursuant to commitment whether or not a subsequent
event not within the lender's control has or may in the future
86 See UCC § 9-312(5)(a) (1972). Consider this additional instructive discussion of
the unified rule:
There are two additional permutations of the case where the intervenor
enters before the first party perfects and the two parties perfect by different
methods. If A and B both made their advances prior to either any filing
or any possession, then the first creditor either to file or to perfect by
some other method would have priority under both the old and the new
9-312(5). Similarly, under both the old and new 9-312(5), if B took pos-
session of the collateral and, before B made his advance, A intervened by
simultaneously making an advance and filing, A's security interest would
have priority over B's because A was the first to perfect. Since there is no
difference in the results of these cases under old and new Article 9, the
revision of 9-312(5) will affect the result only in situations like [the one
discussed in the text of this article] ....
Coogan, supra note 12, at 508-09 n.81.
'- See KRS § 355.9-204(5). Compare UCC § 9-204(3) (1972). The 1972 Amendments
add a definition for the phrase "pursuant to commitment." See notes 188-90 infra and
accompanying text.
,s See Coogan, supra note 12, at 506-07.
UCC § 9-105(l)(k) (1972).
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relieve the lender from his or her obligation to make the ad-
vance. 19° Under this definition, an advance would be pursuant
to commitment even though the contract provides that the lender
will be excused if the debtor defaults (such as by failing to pay
off prior loans) or if the value of the debtor's collateral is
insufficient to secure the advance according to a specified debt
to collateral ratio. The advance also would be pursuant to com-
mitment if the lender makes it despite being excused by the
occurrence of a contractual excuse. On the other hand, an ad-
vance would not be pursuant to commitment if the secured party
reserves complete discretion regarding if and when the advance
is made. The 1972 Amendments employ the definition of "pur-
suant to commitment" in some of the new rules dealing with
the priority of future advances. 19'
a. Secured Party v. Secured Party
Suppose that SPI makes a loan to debtor and perfects by
filing. Then SP2 makes a loan and perfects in the same collateral
by filing. Finally, SP1 makes an advance pursuant to a future
advance clause contained in the original security agreement.
Assuming that the collateral is insufficient to satisfy both secured
claims, does SP1 have priority over SP2 for both advances?
Under the present Code, SP1 clearly has priority for his first
advance under the first-to-file rule. 192 SP1 should have priority
for the second advance under the same priority rule. Indeed,
SP1 should have priority for the second loan even if it was
pursuant to a new security agreement describing the same col-
lateral employed in the first loan. The language of the present
Code's rule is identical to that contained in the 1962 Official
ALI and NCCUSL text which was thought to be so clear and
supportive of these results that there was no reason to modify
it in the 1972 Amendments. 93 Unfortunately, a recent opinion
of the Kentucky Court of Appeals indicates that SP2 would have
190 See id.
191 See notes 192-212 infra and accompanying text.
See KRS § 355.9-312(5)(a).
19S It should make no difference whether the original debt was outstanding at the
time of the future advance or whether SPI and the debtor contemplated future advances
when their security agreement was executed. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 226-
27; Coogan, supra note 12, at 509.
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priority in the new security agreement case. 94 The criticism
generated by this opinion is justified. 195
The correct answer to the priority dispute between SP1 and
SP2 is less clear if the facts are modified so that SP2's perfection
is by means other than filing, such as through possession of the
collateral. Under these new facts, SP2 can argue that the issue
is controlled by the present Code's first-to-perfect rule and SP2
can claim perfection before SPI made and became perfected for
the future advance. 196 This argument is strengthened if the future
advance clause gives SPI discretion- concerning the making of
advances. In effect, this is an argument that SPI has two security
interests and that each is perfected independently. Conversely,
SPI will claim a single security interest of fluctuating size which
became perfected when he or she made the initial loan and which
was continuously perfected thereafter.
SPI should have the better argument under the present
Code. 97 The 1972 Amendments remove any doubt concerning
SPI's priority for both advances by providing that future ad-
vances made while a security interest is perfected by filing or
possession have the same priority as the initial advance. 98 SPI's
initial advance has priority under the 1972 Amendments as the
first to file or perfect. 199 Thus, SP l's second advance has priority
over SP2 because the first advance has priority. 20°
This new rule facilitates financing transactions because se-
cured parties who are the first to file or perfect can make
subsequent advances without the need to reperfect each time. 20'
Subsequent secured parties should not be harmed by this result
1 See ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 615 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1981).
"I See Nowka, Kentucky Law Survey: Commercial Law, 72 Ky. L.J. 337, 342-52
(1983-84). See generally Coogan, supra note 12, at 509-10 (criticizing earlier decisions
with results similar to the 1981 Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion).
See KRS § 355.9-312(5)(b).
See KRS § 355.9-303(2). Cf. note 204 infra and accompanying text.
i' See UCC § 9-312(7) (1972). This amendment also provides that if a commitment
is made before or while the security interest is perfected, the security interest has the
same priority with respect to advances made pursuant thereto. This amendment does
not apply if the initial advance was perfected automatically without filing or possession.
See id.; FNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 227.
i See UCC § 9-312(5)(a) (1972). See also note 186 supra and accompanying text.
See UCC § 9-312(7) (1972).
201 See Coogan, supra note 12, at 511.
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because they are on constructive notice as a result of the earlier
secured party's filing or possession of the collateral. Further-
more, a subsequent secured party may be able to obtain a
purchase money priority.202
b. Secured Party v. Judgment Creditor or Purchaser
Suppose that SP makes a loan to debtor and perfects by
filing against specified collateral owned by debtor. The security
agreement provides SP with the option of making future ad-
vances. A judgment creditor (JC) then obtains a lien on the
same assets. Finally, SP makes an optional advance to debtor.
The present Code provides SP with priority over JC for the first
advance. 203 Although lacking a rule specifically applicable to this
issue, the present Code can and should be interpreted to afford
priority for the future advance.204
The 1972 Amendments would provide a specific rule that
awards priority to SP (1) if the advance was made before or
within forty-five days after the lien came into existence; (2) if
the advance was made without knowledge of the lien; or (3) if
the advance was pursuant to a commitment made without knowl-
edge of the lien.20 5 The forty-five day absolute priority was
designed to mesh with the Federal Tax Lien Act2° which protects
advances made within forty-five days after a tax lien is filed.20 7
The 1972 Amendments' rule works a reasonable accomoda-
tion between secured parties and lien creditors. Although the
latter persons often may lose under this rule, the debtor's work-
ing assets are enhanced by the advance, which may be of some
advantage to lien creditors. Of course, lien creditors are free to
levy upon assets that are not subject to prior security interests.
2 See notes 173-80 supra and accompanying text.
201 See KRS § 355.9-301(l)(b).
21' Here again the conceptual question is whether there is a single perfected security
interest of varying size or whether each advance creates a separate security interest. See
note 196 supra and accompanying text. The former conceptualization is correct. See
generally Friedlander v. Adelphi Mfg. Co., 5 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 7 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1968) (optional future advance has priority over judgment lien); R. HENSON, supra
note 40, at § 5-14.
20 See UCC § 9-301(4) (1972).
See 26 U.S.C. § 6323(c)-(d) (1982).
11 See FNAs. REPORT, supra note 6, at 227-28; W. PLumB, JR., FEDERAL TAX LIENS
87-93 (3d ed. 1972).
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These assets can usually be identified by checking for UCC
filings and making certain that the secured party is not in pos-
session. A lien creditor who does levy on encumbered assets can
obtain some protection against future advances by giving notice
of its lien to prior secured parties. 20 8
A problem similar to that described in the lien creditor
example may arise if the intervening person is a purchaser. The
present Code will protect the purchaser by entirely "cutting off"
SP's security interest if the purchaser is a buyer in the ordinary
course (BOC).209 It will also protect a non-BOC if the sale was
authorized by the secured party.210 But Will a non-BOC in an
unauthorized sale be subject to a prior security interest to the
extent that it secures future advances made after the purchase?2 '
The present Code does not answer this question.
The 1972 Amendments would provide that a non-BOC takes
free of a security interest to the extent that it secures advances
made after the secured party acquires knowledge of the purchase
or made more than forty-five days after the purchase, whichever
first occurs. 21 2 The secured party also will be protected if the
advance was pursuant to a commitment entered into without
knowledge of the purchase and before the expiration of the
forty-five day period. This rule, which is similar but not identical
to the lien creditor rule, assumes that secured parties ought to
become aware of sales of collateral by the debtor. The secured
party has forty-five days of grace for making this discovery.
4. Priority of Lien Creditors
The 1972 Amendments would make a change in the present
Code's rule governing priority disputes between secured parties
and lien creditors that was not discussed in connection with
future advances. The present UCC subordinates security interests
to the rights of persons who become lien creditors without
See KRS § 355.9-301(4).
See KRS §§ 355.9-307(1), .1-201(9).
210 See KRS § 355.9-306(2). This provision has been applied in several Kentucky
cases. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 669 S.W.2d 543.
2,, The non-BOC will be subject to a prior perfected security interest to the extent
that it secures advances made prior to the purchase. See KRS § 355.9-301(I)(c). The
1972 Amendments would not alter this outcome. See UCC § 9-301(1)(c) (1972).
2,2 See UCC § 9-307(3) (1972).
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knowledge of the security interest and before the security interest
is perfected. 21 3 The lack of knowledge requirement is anomalous
given that the presence or absence of knowledge generally is not
outcome-determinative under other priority rules.21 4 For this rea-
son, the 1972 Amendments would drop the requirement that the
lien creditor lack knowledge. 2 5 A lien creditor would have prior-
ity over an unperfected security interest even if it knew of the
security interest prior to obtaining the lien. This 1972 Amend-
ment should not have a detrimental effect on secured parties
who already have ample incentive to perfect promptly under the
present Code.
H. Default
The default-related 1972 Amendments have been character-
ized as nonrevolutionary. 2 6 Several sections contained in Part
Five of Article Nine of the present Code would not be affected,
while others would be modified only slightly. 217 A few of the
amendments, relating to the compulsory disposition of collateral
and foreclosure sales, are worthy of discussion.
The present Code authorizes compulsory disposition of col-
lateral, sometimes called strict foreclosure. 218 Under this proce-
dure, the secured party may keep the collateral in full satisfaction
of the secured indebtedness, thereby foregoing its rights to a
deficiency judgment against the debtor. 21 9 Special protection is
afforded to consumer debtors who have substantial equity in the
collateral. These debtors are entitled to a foreclosure proceed-
ingY. 0 However, this protection can be waived after default. 22'
213 See KRS § 355.9-301(l)(b).
214 See note 178 supra.
215 See UCC § 9-301(I)(b) (1972). The present Code's definition of lien creditor
would be conformed to this modification. See UCC § 9-301(3) (1972).
216 See Coogan, supra note 12, at 518.
217 See UCC §§ 9-501(3), 9-502, 9-504(1)(a) (1972).
21S See KRS § 355.9-505. This remedy is frequently designated "strict foreclosure."
See J. WJrrE & R. SUmMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER Tim UNIFORM ComcmRciA
CODE § 26-8 (2d ed. 1980). However, it is different from the common law right of strict
foreclosure, at least in Kentucky. See D. LEBSON & R. NowKA, supra note 38, at 839.
219 KRS § 355.9-504(2) gives the secured party the right to a deficiency judgment
when the collateral is disposed of in a foreclosure proceeding.
21 If the consumer debtor has paid 60% of the cash price or loan, he is entitled




In addition, all debtors are entitled to written notice of a strict
foreclosure proposal and have the right to object within thirty
days from receipt of the notification. 2 2 Such an objection results
in a foreclosure sale of the collateral.23 However, the present
Code does not expressly provide debtors with the right to waive
notice.
The 1972 Amendments specify that these rights can be waived
after the default. 22 This rule (like the right to waive the special
consumer protective provision described above) seems consistent
with the original rationale for strict foreclosure: The secured
party and debtor are frequently better-off without a foreclosure
sale with its attendant costs and possibility of a deficiency judg-
ment and therefore should be permitted to employ strict foreclo-
sure when it seems mutually beneficial.? Likewise, it may be
mutually beneficial to dispense with the notice and thirty-day
objection period in order to facilitate the use of strict foreclosure
and deficiency avoidance.
A similar problem exists under the present Code's rules
relating to foreclosure sales.2 26 The present Code requires sending
notice of a foreclosure sale to the debtor under many circum-
stances, but the Code is silent on whether this right to notice
may be waived. 227 The 1972 Amendments expressly permit a
post default waiver by the debtor. 28 After a waiver, the secured
party would still be required to dispose of the collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner?29
The 1972 Amendments also seek to remedy other problems
that have surfaced with respect to the present Code's strict
foreclosure provisions. The thirty-day objection period noted
above begins to run upon the debtor's receipt of the secured
- See KRS § 355.9-505(2).
- See KRS § 355.9-504.
- See UCC §§ 9-501(3), 9-505(2) (1972); FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 247.
22 See UCC § 9-505 comment 1 (1962).
- See KRS § 355.9-504(3).
227 See id. Kentucky case law indicates that after default a debtor may waive his
right to notice of sale or be estopped to claim damages by reason of the secured party's
failure to give it. Nelson v. Monarch Investment Plan of Henderson, Inc., 452 S.W.2d
375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
- See UCC §§ 9-501(3), 9-504(3) (1972).
21 See id. Concerning the standard of commercial reasonableness, see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Metcalfe, 663 S.W.2d 957 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Greg Coats Cars, Inc.
v. Kasey, 576 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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party's strict foreclosure proposal. 20 As a result, the actual
waiting period may exceed thirty days. The wise secured party
should obtain a postal return-receipt or other evidence demon-
strating the debtor's receipt. The secured party's situation is
further complicated by the present UCC's requirement that no-
tice also be sent (except in the case of consumer goods) to any
other secured party who has duly filed a financing statement
against the collateral in question or who is otherwise known by
the secured party to have a security interest.231 These persons
also have the right to object within thirty days of receipt.232
Thus, the secured party cannot retain the collateral pursuant to
its strict foreclosure proposal until thirty days after the receipt
of a notice by the last person entitled to it.
The present Code's strict foreclosure rules are also unclear
on when the thirty-day period ends, merely stating that the
objection must be "within thirty days" from the receipt of the
notice.23 Because it is possible that an objection posted on the
thirtieth day may be timely, a careful secured party could feel
compelled to wait several additional days.
All this ambiguity may cause the secured party to wait forty
or more days. 23 4 This can be longer than would be required to
sell the collateral in a foreclosure sale. To make strict foreclosure
more expeditious, the 1972 Amendments would reduce the wait-
ing period to twenty-one days running from the sending of the
strict foreclosure proposal. 5 In addition, objections must be
received by the secured party during the twenty-one day period
in order to require a foreclosure sale. 236
The 1972 Amendments also place limits on the secured par-
ties who are entitled to a strict foreclosure notice. As mentioned
above, under the present Code, notice must be sent to all secured
parties who have duly filed a financing statement or who are




21 See Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies Under Revised Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U.L. REv. 265, 295 (1972-73).
-' See UCC § 9-505(2) (1972). The meaning of "send" includes depositing in the
mail with a proper address and postage provided. See KRS § 355.1-201(38).
See UCC § 9-505(2) (1972).
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known to the secured party who is proposing strict foreclosure. 7
This means that a prudent secured party who wishes to give
notice must search the filing records and also its own records
and memory in order to identify any person who may have
claimed a security interest at some time. Of course, such claims,
which can be informal or verbal, may never have been recorded
or may have been forgotten. This burden may not be justified.
The existence of other secured claimants is probably the excep-
tion rather than the rule.2 18 Moreover, in the unusual case where
there are multiple secured parties, the debtor's equity in the
collateral frequently is sufficient to satisfy only the secured party
proposing strict foreclosure. 2 9 This secured party is virtually
always senior.m These considerations underlie the 1972 Amend-
ments which would require notice only to secured parties who
have made written claims of interests in the collateral prior to
the sending of a strict foreclosure proposal to the debtor (or
before the debtor makes a postdefault waiver of this notice).24'
Returning to the present Code's foreclosure by sale require-
ments, the same rather open-ended group of secured parties
(those that have duly filed plus those who are known to the
foreclosing creditor) are entitled to notice of a foreclosure sale. 242
This notice requirement would be reduced by enactment of the
1972 Amendments in the same fashion and for the same reasons
that limits would be added in the strict foreclosure context. 243
L Fixtures and Other Collateral Associated With Real Estate
Article Nine of the present UCC (which is identical to the
ALI and NCCUSL 1962 Official Text) was designed chiefly to
govern the creation, perfection and enforcement of security in-
M7 See KRS § 355.9-505(2).
21 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 248.
29 See id.
See Davenport, supra note 234, at 289 n.82.1.
See UCC § 9-505(2) (1972). This amendment also eliminates the present Code's
rule that secured parties who are not entitled to notice may "[object] in writing thirty
days after the secured party obtains possession" and force disposition under KRS §
355.9-504. See KRS § 355.9-505(2).
-2 See KRS § 355.9-504(3). This notice requirement is inapplicable in the case of
consumer goods. Id.
-3 See UCC § 9-504(3) (1972). See also 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 253.
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terests in personal property.2" It "does not apply ... to the
creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate,
including a lease or rents thereunder. " 245 However, the present
Code does regulate conflicts between chattel financers and real
estate claimants relating to various categories of collateral as-
sociated with real property.2"
The most significant and most controversial present Code
provision governing the relationship between personal property
lenders and real property owners or encumbrancers is section 9-
313, titled "Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures.' '247 This
provision substantially changed the relative rights and priorities
of competing real property encumbrancers and secured chattel
lenders. 248 The provision also introduced additional confusion
and uncertainty into the law pertaining to fixtures. 249 The wide-
spread dissatisfaction with section 9-313 was a primary reason
for the establishment of the Review Committee to analyze the
1962 Official Text of Article Nine and offer proposed improve-
ments .25
0
The 1972 Amendments to Article Nine address the significant
concerns regarding fixture conflicts with a complete overhaul of
section 9-313 and modifications to related filing provisions.25 '
The result is a clearer, fairer and more comprehensive system of
rules governing perfection of security interests in fixtures and
priority conflicts between secured lenders and real estate claim-
ants .252
See KRS § 355.9-102.
-5 KRS § 355.9-1040).
-4" See KRS §§ 355.9-313, .9-401.
-7 See KRS § 355.9-313.
" Compare UNiFoRM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 7 (act repealed 1952) (real estate
purchaser or lender to such purchaser was protected from secured chattel lenders who
had not filed their security interests in the office where the deed of such real estate was
recorded) with KRS § 355.9-313 (unfiled secured chattel lender could have priority over
an earlier recorded real estate mortgage).
" See Carlson, Fixture Priorities, 4 CARDozo L. Rav. 381 (1983); Coogan, supra
note 12, at 483-85 (1973); Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the
UCC-Part III: Fixtures, 77 COM. L.J. 43 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hawkland, Part
Iii].
2.o Carlson, supra note 249, at 382.
See UCC §§ 9-313 app., 9-401 to 9-403 app. (1972).
252 See generally FNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at ix (aim of 1972 Amendments was
to solve problems generated by Article Nine).
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The rationale supporting the wholesale revamping of section
9-313 in the 1972 Amendments is best understood in the context
of the specific concerns raised by its much-criticized predeces-
sor-the present KRS section 355.9-313-and related sections.
1. Security Interests in Fixtures
a. Definitional Issues
i. Fixtures Under Kentucky Law
The classification "fixture" denotes a category of property
occupying the troublesome middle ground between realty and
personalty. 2 3 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has stated that
goods which have been properly affixed214 to realty as "perma-
nent fixture[s] . . . [become] a part or parcel of the real estate
... and [give] the owner of the soil the same right to [the
fixtures] as the soil itself. ' 255
To a seller of furnaces, lights, appliances, or other goods
typically incorporated in a home or used to improve real prop-
erty, the characterization of goods as fixtures raises serious
concerns. If the seller retains a security interest in the merchan-
dise as collateral for payment of the purchase price, how can
the seller be sure the "affixed" goods may be recovered if his
or her buyer defaults and the holder of a mortgage on the real
estate claims priority as to the goods? 2 6
For many decades the Kentucky courts resolved such con-
flicts by determining whether the article "was in fact so annexed
13 Prof. E.H. Warren has gone so far as to define "fixture" as "realty with a
chattel past and fear of a chattel future." See Ayer, supra note 25, at 944 (quoting
Professor Warren).
21 Proper affixation is deduced from the following tests: "(1) Annexation to realty,
either actual or constructive; (2) adoption or application to the use or purpose to which
that part of the realty to which it is connected is appropriated; and (3) intention to
make the article a permanent accession to the freehold." First State Bank of Eubank v.
Crab Orchard Banking Co., 75 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Ky. 1934). See generally D. LEmsoN
& R. NowIK, supra note 38, at 795 (discussing these tests).
21 Bank of Shelbyville v. Hartford, 104 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Ky. 1937).
11 Compare Morrow Mfg. Co. v. Race Creek Coal Co., 2 S.W.2d 662 (Ky. 1928)
(chattel mortgage of conditional vendor of coal-shaking screen installed in coal mine
held inferior to prior mortgage on the real estate based upon conclusion that the screen
was an "immovable fixture") with Gas & Electric Shop, Inc. v. Corey-Scheffel Lumber
Co., 13 S.W.2d 1009 (Ky. 1929) (contrary result obtained where collateral was kitchen
appliance deemed not "attached to the freehold").
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to the realty that it could not be removed without injury to the
freehold." ' 217 If that question was answered affirmatively, the
real estate mortgagor's interest in the "fixture" would prevail.
21
Later, more sophisticated analyses developed to delineate the
"permanent fixture" boundary. 2 9
ii. Present Code Treatment of Security Interests in Fixtures
The Kentucky legislature's adoption of Article Nine of the
UCC dramatically altered the landscape of fixture conflicts.
260
However, the present Code does not venture a new or compre-
hensive definition of "fixtures.' '261 Rather, it defers the matter
to "the law of this state other than this Act.''262 The present
UCC does exclude from coverage goods which have become an
integral part of the structure, such as "lumber, bricks, tile,
cement, glass, metal work and the like.' '263 While structural
materials might qualify as fixtures under common law tests,
their incorporation into the very fabric of the realty renders
them inappropriate subjects for chattel financing.264 Having thus
limited the class of real estate-related goods reachable by an
Article Nine security interest to "nonstructural" fixtures, the
See 75 S.W.2d at 517.
IM Id. at 517-18.
29 In Tarter v. Turpin, 291 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1956), the Kentucky Court of Appeals
stated:
In Doll v. Guthrie, .. the general rule is laid down that in determining
whether an article is a permanent fixture three tests are applied: first,
annexation to realty, either actual or constructive; second, adaptation or
application to the use or purpose that the part of the realty to which it is
connected is appropriated; and, third, the intention of the parties to make
the article a permanent accession to the freehold with title to the article in
the one owning the freehold. This court has further said, and it is the
general rule, that the controlling factor is the intention of the parties.
Id. at 548. In at least one case the Kentucky Supreme Court indicated that there may
be "fixtures" which are not a part of the freehold. See Gas & Elec. Shop, Inc. v.
Corey-Scheffel Lumber Co., 13 S.W.2d at 1010. To that extent, there may be a common
law distinction between a "fixture" and a "permanent fixture."
2m See notes 247-49 supra and accompanying text.
See KRS § 355.9-313(1).
2Id.
263 See id.
- In such cases, the rights of a seller of material may be protected through a
conventional real estate mortgage or by the filing of a mechanic's lien on the property.
See KRS §§ 376.010, 382.110. See generally D. LiEBsoN & R. NowKA, supra note 38,
at 795-96 (exemplifying materials which cannot be secured by a chattel security interest).
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present Code goes on to provide that an Article Nine secured
lender deemed to have priority over competing security interests
may, upon debtor default, remove his or her fixture collateral
from the real estate.265 Although material injury to the freehold
might theoretically result, the removing party may be liable to
real property claimants (other than the debtor) for physical
injuries to the property.26 In situations where anticipated repair
costs approximate the value of the collateral, a chattel financer
may elect not to remove his or her collateral from the premises.267
iii. Effect of the 1972 Amendments
The foregoing provisions have not been changed substantially
by the 1972 Amendments. 26 However, the proposed statutory
language is much more straightforward than present Code pro-
visions. Section 9-313 of the 1972 Amendments begins with a
general definition of "fixtures": "[G]oods are 'fixtures' when
they become so related to particular real estate that an interest
in them arises under real estate law. . "269
The new definition of "fixtures," like the common law
definition, technically incorporates goods which are integrally
incorporated in the real estate.270 However, the amended provi-
sion continues to exclude "ordinary building materials incorpo-
rated into an improvement on land" from the coverage of Article
Nine.271
See KRS § 355.9-313(5).
2 Id. However, he is not liable for "any diminuition in value of the real estate
caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity for replacing them."
Id.
21 See generally Hawkland, Part III, supra note 249, at 44-45.
It was thought that considerations of economics would prevent a condi-
tional seller from effecting removal if [the collateral was] so much a part
of the building that the physical damage to the structure would offset the
gain of removal. On the other hand, if this economic situation did not
deter removal, this was proof positive that an item was really a fixture
that could be taken, with reimbursement for physical damage to the real
property, by the chattel financer against non-protected realty interests.
Id.
See UCC § 9-313 (1972).
- UCC § 9-313(1)(a) (1972). See also FNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 197-99
(discussing the topic of "fixtures").
270 See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 197-99.
-' See UCC § 9-313(2) (1972).
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The official comment to the amended section makes clear
that although an Article Nine security interest may not exist in
ordinary building materials incorporated into realty, this is with-
out prejudice to any rights a secured party may have against a
debtor or other party for wrongful incorporation of the collat-
eral .272
The 1972 Amendments also retain the substance of the pres-
ent Code provision expressing the secured party's right to remove
fixture collateral upon debtor default even though some injury
to the real property might result.273
The definitional and explanatory language set forth in the
1972 Amendments and related comments offers a clearer, more
comprehensive view of the scope of section 9-313 and its rela-
tionship to the common law of fixtures than does the present
Code.274 However, the basic scope of section 9-313 has not
changed.
On the other hand, considerable confusion and controversy
has been generated by present UCC provisions relating to (1)
perfection of security interests in fixtures and (2) priorities be-
tween Article Nine security interests in fixtures and real estate
interests. 275 This prompted a complete overhaul of the pertinent
present Code provisions in the 1972 Amendments. 276
2 See UCC § 9-313 comment 2 (1972). The official comment further explains the
tripartite classification of property associated with real estate which forms the conceptual
foundation of § 9-313. Goods which "retain their chattel character entirely" and which
do not give rise to real estate interests (as, for example, a typewriter or portable personal
computer) do not fall within the scope of § 9-313 but are.generally regulated by other
Code provisions governing security interests and priorities. Goods which have become
"real estate" for all practical purposes (ordinary building materials incorporated in
improvements to realty such as gypsum board or masonry) are not within the scope of
§ 9-313 or of Article Nine generally. A third, "intermediate" class of goods "which has
become real estate for certain purposes, but as to which chattel financing may be
preserved" is that class of "fixtures" which is the subject of § 9-313. See UCC § 9-313
comment 3 (1972).
See UCC § 9-313(8) (1972).
' See generally FiNAL REPoRT, supra note 6, at ix (aim of 1972 Amendments was
to solve problems generated by Article Nine).
21 See generally Carlson, supra note 249, at 381-82 (real estate bar found UCC §
9-313 highly controversial); Coogan, supra note 12, at 483-505 (both real estate owners
or occupants who desired non-real estate mortgage financing and present or future realty
owners were unhappy with the UCC § 9-313); Hawkland, Part III, supra note 249, at
45-50 (real estate financers confused and upset with the drafting of UCC § 9-313).
"6 See Carlson, supra note 249, at 382; Hawkland, Part III, supra note 249, at 45.
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b. Fixture Filing and Perfection Issues
i. Present Code Provisions
The present Code gives little guidance to those who would
attempt to perfect a security interest in goods which are or may
be fixtures. Kentucky's version of Article Nine provides that a
"filing is required for a fixture under KRS 355.9-313.' 277 It also
states that to perfect a security interest in goods "which at the
time the security interest attaches are or are to become fixtures,"
a secured party must file "in the office where a mortgage on
the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded.''278
Does this mean a filing must be made in the real estate
records? The present Code fails to provide an explicit answer.
The inference of the statutory language and of the official com-
ment is that a filing in the real estate records is expected.279
Curiously, Article Nine provisions regulating the duties of filing
officers are devoted exclusively to chattel filings and offer no
guidance to officials and others as to how a fixture financing
statement is to be filed and indexed in the real estate records. 280
Assuming the "fixture filing" must be made in the real estate
records, what form is it to take? Is it sufficient for a filing party
to comply with the requirements set forth in Article Nine for
standard chattel financing statements? 2 ' If so, how is a real
estate encumbrancer or other party searching the real estate files
to locate the filing?
The present Code makes no special provision for fixture
filing statements other than to require "a description of the real
estate concerned. ' '2, 2 There is no requirement that property be
defined by "metes and bounds" or by any other technical de-
scription which might be required in the recording of a standard
mortgage on real estate. 283
Likewise, the inclusion of the name of the record owner of
the property is not required where that person is other than the
27 KRS § 355.9-302(1)(d).
s KRS § 355.9-401(1)(b). See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
-9 KRS § 355.9-401(1)(b). See also 1962 OxnciAL TEXT, supra note 4, at § 9-401
comment 2.
See KRS § 355.9-403.
" See KRS § 355.9-402.
22 KRS § 355.9-402(1).
' See 1962 OFnciAL TEXT, supra note 4, at § 9-402 comment 1.
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debtor.284 This may create problems for a prospective purchaser
or mortgagor of rental property. Assume 0 owns Greenacre and
L, occupying Greenacre under a short term lease, installs light
fixtures subject to Seller SP's security interest. Because "fixture
debtor" L's name does not appear in the chain of title, unless
O's name appears on SP's fixture filing the security interest may
not be revealed to a real estate searcher checking O's title. 285
Concerns regarding the uncertainties and ambiguities of Code
provisions relating to fixture filing spurred a wide variety of
disparate responses aimed at ensuring the compatibility of the
Article Nine filing provisions with existing real estate recording
systems.2 6 Some states revised the UCC filing requirements to
require inclusion of the name of the record owner of the related
real estate on fixture financing statements; other states went to
the extreme of requiring a complete legal description of the land
in the fixture filing.287
ii. Effect of the 1972 Amendments
The 1972 Amendments eliminate the uncertainties inherent
in existing statutory language. "Fixture filing" is now specifi-
cally defined.n 8 Its special formal requisites include: (1) a state-
ment on the face of the financing statement that it is to be filed
in the real estate records, (2) a description of the real estate,
and (3) inclusion of the name of a record owner if the debtor
does not hold an interest of record. 289 States are allowed the
option of requiring that the financing statement contain a full-
blown description of the real estate comparable in all respects
to that which the law would require in connection with a re-
corded mortgage on the real estate.29° A related subsection spe-
cifically provides that a real estate mortgage may be effective as
a fixture filing if it contains a description of the affixed goods
and meets certain other requirements. 29'
See KRS § 355.9-402.
2 See generally Coogan, supra note 12, at 490-91 (1972 Amendments to Article
Nine enable a real estate searcher to locate a fixture debtor).
See id.
Z Id.
See UCC §§ 9-313(1), 9-402(5) (1972).
9 See UCC § 9-402(5) (1972).
o See id.
' See UCC § 9-402(6) (1972).
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The 1972 Amendments instruct the filing officer to index
"fixture filings" in the real estate records. 292 Where the debtor
is not a record owner, the financing statement must be indexed
under the name of a record owner as well as under that of the
debtor.
293
iii. Perfection of Security Interests by Fixture Filing
Thus the 1972 Amendments clarify Code requirements gov-
erning fixture filing. The next question is whether a fixture filing
is in all cases necessary or desirable to protect a given security
interest associated with realty. For example, consider the case in
which Seller SP retains a security interest in an item of factory
machinery which he or she sells to A for installation and use in
the latter's plant. If SP is unsure whether the law will deem the
installed machinery to be a "fixture" or a "chattel," SP may
elect to file both a conventional UCC financing statement in the
chattel records and a fixture filing in the real estate records. On
the other hand, SP may conclude that the cost of having a
fixture filing prepared is excessive in comparison to the protec-
tion gained (particularly if a technical legal description of the
land is required on the financing statement) .294 In the latter case,
could SP derive any protection from the filing of a simple chattel
financing statement if his or her collateral is deemed to be a
fixture?
Under the present Code, the best answer appears to be that
a filing in the personal property records as to property later
found to be a fixture provides no protection whatever to the
secured party.295 For example, assume that SP files a personal
property financing statement in the UCC records of the appro-
priate county clerk's office on the assumption that the collateral
is and will remain "equipment.' '296 If it turns out that SP was
mistaken and that the collateral is connected to real property in
such a manner as to be deemed a "fixture," SP's security interest
will be unperfected and vulnerable to subsequent encumbrances
See UCC § 9-403(7) (1972).
293 Id.
19 See Coogan, supra note 12, at 490-91.
29S J. WHmm & R. SuMMxins, supra note 218, at 1057.
See generally KRS §§ 355.9-109(2), .9-401(1)(c) (instructions as to filing location).
See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
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on the related real estate as well as to perfected chattel security
interests and judicial liens. 297 The last category of competitors
includes the "lien creditor par excellence," the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. 29
8
By recognizing certain instances in which priority may be
gained and maintained by means of perfection other than fixture
filing, the 1972 Amendments have addressed the practical needs
of secured sellers of, and lenders against, goods which are or
may become fixtures. 299 These instances include situations in
which the fixture collateral is particularly susceptible to charac-
terization as a nonfixture (i.e., consumer goods or equipment)
and conflicts involving judicial lienors of real estate (chiefly the
bankruptcy trustee).300 However, these issues are best explored
in the context of concerns regarding priorities of interests in
fixtures.
c. Priority Concerns
i. Present Code Provisions
Central to the present Code fixtures provisions and to Article
Nine generally is the setting of priorities of secured interests and
other interests in property. Because Article Nine deals primarily
with priorities in personal property, it came as a great surprise
to real estate lenders to discover that their rights were affected-
in some cases dramatically-by the fixtures provisions of the
present UCC.30
Of particular concern to many real estate financers was the
section of the present Code providing that where an Article Nine
security interest in goods attaches prior to affixation of the goods
See KRS §§ 355.9-313, .9-301.
- See KRS § 355.9-301(3). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2597 (1978) and the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984), amended federal
bankruptcy law to clarify the status of a bankruptcy trustee vis-a-vis fixtures associated
with the bankrupt's real property. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)(3) (West 1979) gives the trustee
in bankruptcy the rights of "a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor."
However, fixtures are expressly excepted from the scope of this provision and it is clear
that the trustee's rights as to fixture collateral are to be limited to those of a hypothetical
creditor with a judgment lien.
See UCC § 9-313(3), (4) (1972).
'1 See id.
"I Hawkland, Part III, supra note 249, at 45.
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to realty, that interest shall have priority over all prior claims
in the related realty.302 Under this provision, a seller creating a
security interest in goods before they are affixed to real estate
has priority over preexisting mortgages on the realty. This would
be the case even if the seller had not filed a fixture filing as to
the collateral and the collateral could not be removed without
material injury to the real estate.30 3 Where the security interest
attaches after the goods are affixed, the priorities are reversed.
3 4
The rationale behind these provisions is that a real estate
mortgagee could not be said to have relied upon the value of
goods which were subsequently affixed in place.305 Moreover, to
give the real estate mortgagee priority over a financer of fixture
improvements to the realty would allow the former to reap a
windfall at the expense of the latter. Such a result would dis-
courage chattel financers of fixture-improvements.
3 0
The remaining priority rule in the present Code applies a
"race/notice" scheme to determine priorities among fixture se-
cured parties and "subsequent" real estate interests.3 0 7 That is,
if the secured party peifects first or if the opposing parties act
with knowledge of his or her security interest, the secured party
achieves priority over "subsequent" real estate purchasers and
judicial lien creditors and over prior encumbrancers who subse-
quently make advances.30 8
The present Code's priority system has received severe criti-
cism from chattel and real estate financers on numerous grounds.
First, real estate lenders were particularly concerned about the
potential impact of a rule which allows even unperfected chattel
interests in fixtures to have priority over prior real estate mort-
302 KRS § 355.9-313(2).
10 See also text accompanying notes 265-67 supra (examining when a secured lender
might remove his fixed collateral).
KRS § 355.9-313(3).
3o Carlson, supra note 249, at 386.
m6 Id.
- See KRS § 355.9-313(4).
101 See id. The use of the modifier "subsequent" in KRS § 355.9-313(4) is ambig-
uous. It is unclear whether the drafters were referring to real estate encumbrances which
came into being subsequent to attachment of the conflicting security interest or, rather,
subsequent to affixation of the goods. However, the implication of comment 4 to the
1962 Official Text is that "subsequent" is intended to mean "post affixation." See D.
LEsoN & R. NowK.A, supra note 38, at 796-98.
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gages and encumbrances. 3°9 The most serious grievance may have
been expressed on behalf of construction mortgagees. These
lenders typically execute and record their real property security
interests prior to the start of construction. Hence, they fall under
the rules governing prior encumbrancers. However, a construc-
tion mortgagee usually puts additional funds into an improve-
ment to realty as it progresses and therefore does not fit
comfortably within the rationale favoring chattel security inter-
ests attached to goods prior to affixation over prior real estate
encumbrances.' 10
Chattel financers also complained about the present Code's
fixtures provisions. 31 Despite being generally able to prevail
against prior encumbrancers without regard to perfection, the
lender against goods which are to become fixtures must still
worry about subsequent interests, such as that of the bankrupcty
trustee.312 As previously discussed, problems with classifying goods
as "fixtures" or "nonfixtures" and economic considerations
often cause a chattel financer to forego a fixture filing and rely
upon the protection afforded by the filing of conventional chattel
financing statements.31 3 Unfortunately such measures offer no
protection against a subsequent interest such as the lien of a
bankruptcy trustee if the collateral is determined to be a "fix-
ture. ' 31 4 Moreover, once the chattel security interest is avoided
by the trustee, the latter is allowed to "preserve" the interest
for the benefit of its estate.3 1 5 To the extent that the avoided
chattel security interest was entitled to priority over preexisting
real estate encumbrances, the trustee may assert the avoided
interest against such real estate encumbrancers (even if the trustee
could not avoid the real estate encumbrance by any other
means) .316
These and other concerns motivated the Article Nine Review
Committee to propose a new and different scheme of priority
Im Cf. pre-Code cases cited in note 256 supra.
310 See Hawkland, Part III, supra note 249, at 48.
'" See, e.g., Coogan, supra note 12, at 488-89.
312 See Hawkland, Part III, supra note 249, at 48.
M, See text accompanying notes 294-300 supra.
314 See id.
315 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1979). See also Hawkland, Part III, supra note
249, at 48-50.
316 See note 315 supra.
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rules governing interests in fixtures.317 The 1972 Amendments to
the fixtures priority rules explicitly provide that personal prop-
erty security interests in real-estate-related collateral are subor-
dinate to conflicting realty interests covering the same collateral
unless the Code provides otherwise.31 8
ii. Effect of the 1972 Amendments
The main priority rule of the amended fixtures section is
based upon the same "race" concept applied generally to prior-
ities under the present Code and nonfixture 1972 Amendments.3 19
Thus, to have priority, a fixture financer must make a fixture
filing before a conflicting real estate interest is of record.320 This
rule prevents "surprise and deception" to real estate interests
and redresses the balance between real and personal property
financial interests. It also affords real estate encumbrancers ad-
ditional protection from assaults by bankruptcy trustees. 321
The principal exception to this priority rule involves purchase
money security interests in fixtures.3 22 Provided the security in-
terest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods are affixed
or within ten days thereafter, such interests enjoy priority over
earlier-recorded real estate encumbrances .323 Since most Article
Nine security interests in fixtures are of the purchase money
type, this exception is particularly important. 324 The perfection
requirement helps to shield the prior encumbrancer's interest
from the bankruptcy trustee.3 25 The ten-day grace period for
filing is analogous to the provisions in the 1972 Amendments
which regulate purchase money security interests in the context
of conventional chattel financing. 326
317 For a general discussion of other interpretational problems associated with the
present § 9-313, see Carlson, supra note 249, at 390-94. See also FnA REPORT, supra
note 6, at 197-205 (discussing the topic of fixtures).
31 See UCC § 9-313(7) (1972).
3.9 See UCC §§ 9-313(4)(b), 9-301, 9-312 (1972). See also text accompanying notes
181-82 supra.
3 See UCC § 9-313(4)(b) (1972).
32, See text accompanying notes 315-16 supra.
See UCC § 9-313(4)(a) (1972).
32 See id.
1 See Coogan, supra note 12, at 494.
31 See text accompanying notes 315-16 supra.
3- See UCC § 9-312(4) (1972). See also text accompanying notes 173-80 supra. KRS
§§ 355.9-312(4), .9-301(2) contain nonuniform 20-day grace periods.
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The Review Committee recognized that the purchase money
priority presented a "difficult problem" when the competing
encumbrancer was a construction mortgagee. 327 The construction
mortgagee finances improvements to realty and makes periodic
advances in reliance upon that real property.3 28 Undoubtedly
those advances frequently assist in funding the purchase of goods
which are subsequently affixed to the realty. Thus, the 1972
Amendments include a special rule granting a construction mort-
gagee priority over Article Nine interests in cases where (1) his
or her mortgage is recorded before the goods are affixed and
(2) the goods are affixed during the course of construction.329
This "superpriority" during the construction period even defeats
the claims of a duly-perfected purchase money lender. 330
The drafters of the 1972 Amendments have also addressed
the need of chattel security lenders for protective measures short
of fixture filing.331 The 1972 Amendments make it clear that
fixture collateral is subject to the general rule that a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods is perfected without
filing and is therefore effective under Article Nine against lien
creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy. 3 2 In those cases involv-
ing conflicts between two perfected chattel security interests in
a fixture, the matter will likely be resolved under the general
Article Nine priority provisions333 and not section 9-313.334
Moreover, the revised section 9-313 describes two situations
in which a security interest "perfected by any method permitted
by [Article Nine]" takes priority over conflicting real estate
encumbrancers. 335 Security interests in fixtures which are "[1]
readily removable factory or office machines or [2] readily re-
movable replacements of domestic appliances which are con-
sumer goods" may be perfected by either a chattel filing or a
27 See FNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 203.
12 See id.
3 See UCC § 9-313(6) (1972).
330 See id.
3" See UCC §§ 9-302(1)(d), 9-313(4)(c), (d) (1972).
331 See UCC § 9-302(1)(d) (1972); FAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 204. See also
note 383 infra and accompanying text.
" See notes 108-202 supra and accompanying text.
34 J. Wara & R. Suiosmas, supra note 218, at 1064. Contra Carlson, supra note
249, at 418-23.
,3 See UCC § 9-313(4)(c) (1972).
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fixture filing (or perfected automatically in the case of a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods), so long as perfection
predates affixation of the goods.33 6 As the official comment
explains, the rule "was made necessary by the confusions of the
law as to whether certain machinery and appliances become
fixtures. 1337
Thus, if a secured party can demonstrate that the collateral
securing his or her debt is "readily removable factory or office
machines" or "replacements of domestic appliances which are
consumer goods, 3 8 the secured party may perfect by means
short of a full-blown fixture filing and may even be accorded
superiority over construction mortgages. 339 However, the section
introduces a new subcategory of fixtures and raises new defini-
tional issues. Consider the example of Seller A's security interest
in an item of factory equipment sold to B for use in B's plant.
Presumably if the equipment is mechanical it is "machinery."
However, if the equipment is mounted on casters or is relatively
portable, it may not qualify as a "fixture" at all and therefore
may be entirely outside the scope of section 9-313. On the other
hand, if the machine is seemingly a "fixture" but is bolted to
the floor or wired into the building's electrical system, is it
"readily removable"?34° In the latter case uncertainty may dictate
that, where possible, the secured party file financing statements
in both the chattel and the real estate records.3 41
Another provision of the amended section 9-313 addresses
what may be the single greatest concern of secured lenders: the
conflicting interest of a trustee appointed to administer a bank-
rupt debtor's property.3 42 As previously noted, the present Code
appears to allow perfection of security interests in fixtures by a
336 Id.
" See UCC § 9-313 comment 4(d) (1972). The exclusion of "original" domestic
appliances from the provision was based upon the drafters' conclusion that such appli-
ances are frequently financed as a part of real estate financing of new dwellings;
therefore, no special priority is given to chattel financing of "original" domestic appli-
ances. See Carlson, supra note 249, at 410-11.
338 See UCC § 9-313(4)(c) (1972).
- See UCC § 9-313(6) (1972); Carlson, supra note 249, at 411.
- See UCC § 9-313(4)(c) (1972). See generally Coogan, supra note 12, at 496-97
(discussing the removability of chattels).
3,' See Coogan, supra note 12, at 497. A thoughtful critique of § 9-313(4)(c) is
presented in Carlson, supra note 249, at 407-12.
342 See UCC § 9-313(4)(d) (1972).
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single means: filing in the real estate records . 43 Failing this, a
security interest is unperfected for all purposes and will fall
before the lien of a trustee in bankruptcy.3 44
The 1972 Amendments alter this state of affairs by providing
that a security interest in fixtures perfected by any method
permitted by Article Nine shall prevail over judgment liens on
the property acquired subsequent to the perfection.3 45 Since
bankruptcy trustees and ordinary judgment lien creditors gen-
erally acquire their lienor status without reliance upon real estate
records, the Article Nine Review Committee concluded that a
lender against fixtures should not be required to fe in the real
estate records to perfect his or her interest. 34 Thus, for example,
perfection by chattel filing of the security interest of a vendor
of lighting fixtures sold for office use will protect the secured
seller against the onslaught of a bankruptcy trustee for most
purposes if the buyer/debtor subsequently goes bankrupt. If the
light fixtures are bought for use as consumer goods, perfection
is automatic under Article Nine and no filing of any kind would
be necessary for such protection.347
Two other provisions of the amended section 9-313 represent
no change in the law but serve to clarify certain other situations
in which perfection of fixture security interests is unnecessary.
First, it is recognized that perfection is unnecessary to provide
a chattel financer priority over an encumbrancer or owner of
realty who has so consented in writing or otherwise "disclaimed
an interest in the goods as fixtures. ' 348 Second, the 1972 Amend-
ments address security interests in goods affixed to the real estate
of one other than the debtor.349 In the latter case, even an
unperfected security interest is entitled to priority over rival real
estate interests "if the debtor has a right to remove the goods
" See text accompanying notes 294-300 supra.
" Explicit references in §§ 544(a)(3) and 547(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code make
clear that, where fixtures are concerned, the trustee in bankruptcy is to be treated strictly
as a creditor who has acquired a judicial lien upon the property of the debtor. See note
298 supra.
" UCC § 9-313(4)(d) (1972).
- See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 200-01.
-1 See UCC § 9-302(l)(d) (1972). See also note 383 infra and accompanying text.
" UCC § 9-313(5)(a) (1972).
3 See UCC § 9-313(5)(b) (1972).
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against the encumbrancer or owner. ' 350 This is an embodiment
of the well-recognized principle that a landlord generally has no
interest in "trade fixtures" installed by a tenant, and therefore,
perfection should not be required to protect an Article Nine
security interest in that property against the landlord.3 51
All in all, the 1972 Amendments represent a substantial
improvement over existing statutory provisions insofar as secu-
rity interests in fixtures are concerned. 352
2. Perfection of Security Interests in Oil,
Gas, Minerals and Timber
The present Code treats oil, gas and minerals as a part of
realty until they have been extracted. 353 Therefore, it does not
provide for filing of a security interest in such collateral to be
effective prior to extraction.35 4 In general, this practice is contin-
ued in the 1972 revisions. 355 Although new filing requirements
for security interests in oil, gas and minerals are provided in the
revised Article Nine to take account of changes to section 9-103
regarding multistate transactions, such security interests still do
not attach until extraction. 35 6
Under the present Code, a financing statement against min-
erals need not describe the land where the minerals are located.3 57
However, the security agreement covering the minerals must
contain such a description. 358 This requirement is incongruous in
35 Id.
See Carlson, supra note 249, at 405-07.
352 A number of authors have addressed themselves to possible improvements to
the fixtures provisions in the 1972 Amendments. For example, Professor Hawkland has
noted that while the amended provisions offer some protection to a chattel financer who
files a chattel financing statement covering collateral which later turns out to be a
"fixture," the revisions offer no solace to the lender who files a fixture filing when a
chattel filing was required. Professor Hawkland would include a provision extending
limited protection to the latter. See Hawkland, Part III, supra note 249, at 50. For a
more general critique of the 1972 Amendments as they affect security interests in fixtures,
see Carlson, supra note 249, at 407-29.
353 See KRS §§ 355.2-107, .9-105(1)(f).
31, See FiNAL REPoRT, supra note 6, at 211.
315 See UCC §§ 2-107, 9-105(1)(h) (1972).
336 See UCC §§ 9-103(5), 9-401, 9-402 (1972). Mineral-related multistate transaction
aspects of the 1972 Amendments are discussed at note 514 infra and accompanying text.
M See KRS § 355.9-402; FNAt REPORT, supra note 6, at 211.
353 KRS § 355.9-203(l)(b).
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light of the Code's approach to minerals and would be elimi-
nated by the 1972 Amendments.
35 9
The present statute treats standing timber as real estate.
36
Timber is not included in the definition of "goods" covered by
Article Nine.361 Unfortunately, this treatment serves as an im-
pediment to loans against timber to be cut because lenders have
been forced to comply with filing requirements relating to real
estate mortgages. 62 For this reason, a number of states with
significant timber industries have enacted nonuniform versions
of Code provisions relating to timber and have defined timber
to be cut under a contract for sale as "goods.1
363
The 1972 Amendments incorporate changes in Articles Two
and Nine to redefine as "goods" timber which is to be cut.
3 64
Corresponding revisions to the filing provisions allow a Code
filing which designates timber as collateral. 361 However, the filing
must be made in the local real estate records so as to give notice




The present UCC contains several provisions specifically ap-
plicable to security interests in agriculture-related collateral such
as crops, livestock, and farm machinery. The 1972 Amendments
would eliminate two of these rules. 367
The present Code provides that "[n]o security interest at-
taches under an after-acquired property clause to crops which
become such more than one year after the security agreement is
35 See UCC § 9-203 (1972).
See KRS § 355.2-107.
-1 See KRS § 355.9-105(l)(f).
ml See FNA REPoRT, supra note 6, at 210.
363 Id.
6 See UCC §§ 2-107, 9-105(1), 9-203, 9-204(2) (1972). See also notes 70-71 supra
and accompanying text.
-5 See UCC §§ 9-401(1), 9-402(1), 9-402(3), 9-402(5), 9-403(7) (1972).
" See UCC §§ 9-401(l), 9-402(1), 9-402(3), 9-403(7); FNAL REPORT, supra note 6,
at 210.
367 See generally Hawkland, The Proposed Amendment to Article 9 of the U.C.C.




executed. ' 68 This rule was intended to protect farmers from
long-term encumbrances on their future crops. 369 It was originally
thought that financers making seed or fertilizer loans should be
secured only in crops grown during the current crop year and
not thereafter.3 70 This limitation also applies when the crop
security interest is granted to secure a long-term arrangement
for financing farm machinery or other capital assets a.37
In practice, this limitation on after-acquired property clauses
frequently has been circumvented by financers who annually
obtain new crop security agreements executed by farmer-debt-
ors. 372 These financers enjoy priority for these subsequent secu-
rity interests dating from the time of filing of their original
financing statements pursuant to the present Code's first-to-file
priority rule. 373 The 1972 Amendments would eliminate this lim-
itation because it proved meaningless and created unnecessary
paper work. 374 This repeal also may facilitate enabling loans
which make it possible for farmers to acquire credit essential to
the purchase of productive assets. 375
The 1972 Amendments also would repeal the present UCC
rule that a purchase money security interest in farm equipment
having a purchase price not in excess of $500 can be perfected
automatically without either filing or possession of the collat-
eral. 376 Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the 1962 Official Text
contained an identical rule except that the specified purchase
price was $2,500. 377 The origins of this automatic perfection rule
are obscure. It may have been based on a supposed similarity
36 KRS § 355.9-204(4)(a). The rule is subject to an exception applicable to certain
security interests granted in conjunction with a lease or a land purchase or improvement
transaction. See id.




373 See notes 106-27 supra and accompanying text (discussion of financing statement
duration); notes 181-86 supra and accompanying text (discussion of first-to-file rule).
314 See FnAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 207.
371 See Hawkland, Part I, supra note 367, at 421-22.
376 See KRS § 355.9-302(l)(c). Filing is required for farm equipment that are fixtures
or motor vehicles required to be licensed. Id. Any downpayment should be included in
deciding whether the threshold amount is exceeded. See Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968).
3- See UCC § 9-302(1)(c) (1962).
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between farm equipment and consumer goods which are subject
to their own automatic perfection rule. 378
The automatic perfection rule proved unsatisfactory in the
view of the ALl and NCCUSL. 379 Several states, including Ken-
tucky, minimized its scope by reducing the purchase price of the
farm equipment to which it applied. 380 There also was substantial
opinion that the rule hurt farmers because prospective lenders
against farm equipment could not be certain there were no prior
unfiled, but perfected, purchase money security interests. 3 1 The
rule also may have been of little value to those purchase money
secured creditors who could qualify for automatic perfection
because filing remained necessary to protect the security interest
against certain purchasers of farm equipment. 3 2 For these rea-
sons, the 1972 Amendments eliminate the rule. It should be
noted that creditors who finance the acquisition of consumer
goods by farmers (that is, goods that will be used for personal,
family or household purposes) would still be able to obtain
automatic perfection under a revised UCC.383
K. Multistate Transactions
Section 9-103 of the 1972 Amendments contains some of the
most significant revisions proposed by the ALI and the NCCUSL.
Conflicts scholars have criticized the present Code's choice of
law provisions.3 84 The 1972 Amendments reflect some of that
37, See KRS § 355.9-302(l)(d). No maximum price is specified by this consumer
goods rule. See generally UCC § 9-302 comment 4 (1962).
'17 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 208.
3 See KRS § 355.9-302(l)(c); FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 208.
s" See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 208. The Final Report indicates a concern
that "[t]he $2,500 amount cannot be dismissed by lenders as immaterial, because sub-
stantial aggregates of collateral could have been financed by separate purchase money
transactions each of which was no greater than $2,500." Id. This possibility presumably
is reduced by the $500 cutoff under the Kentucky version of the rule. See KRS § 355.9-
302(l)(c).
"2 See KRS § 355.9-307(5). The 1972 Amendments, if enacted, would also modify
this provision to reflect the elimination of the automatic perfection rule for farm
equipment. See UCC § 9-307(2) (1972). The Kentucky General Assembly has also enacted
nonuniform amendments intended to protect various purchasers of farm-related collat-
eral. See KRS §§ 355.9-307(2), .9-307(3), .9-307(4), .9-307(6), .9-319.
". See UCC § 9-302(l)(d)(1972).
W8, See Weintraub, Choice of Law in Secured Personal Property Transactions: The
Impact of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 MICH. L. REv. 684 (1970).
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criticism.3 85 Although the choice of law rules selected in the
amendments contain some troublesome areas, they eradicate a
number of difficulties found in the present Code.
Enactment of the 1972 Amendments would resolve a contin-
uing dispute38 6 over which choice of law provisions in the present
Code govern secured transactions. Under the 1972 Amendments,
section 9-103 governs only the issue of perfection of a security
interest in multistate transactions. 8 7 The revised section elimi-
nates the difficulty in determining whether the present Code's
general choice of law provisions in section 1-105, or the more
specific rule of present Code section 9-102, govern other prob-
lems arising out of any transaction involving a security interest. s
This portion of the 1972 Amendments should prove helpful by
eliminating from Article Nine consideration of choice of law
problems that concern primarily the original parties to a secured
transaction, the secured party and the debtor. The 1972 amend-
ments would permit Article Nine to focus upon the more im-
portant question of where to file in order to protect an interest
against competing third parties. 38 9 For example, rights of the
parties to the agreement upon default would be governed by the
general provisions of section 1-105 under the 1972 Amendments,
but the perfection or nonperfection of the party claiming secured
status would depend upon section 9-103. 390 It should be noted
that, while the general choice of law rules under section 1-105
permit the parties to select the law of a jurisdicton "reasonably"
related to the transaction, 391 the rules of section 9-103 of the
3- See UCC § 9-103 (1972).
3" See Doyle v. Northrop Corp., 455 F. Supp. 1318, 1326-29 (D.N.J. 1978) (validity
of a contract is governed by law of the place where it is made); Associates Discount
Corp. v. Cary, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646, 651 (N.Y. City Cir. Ct. 1965) (UCC provisions in
state where property is located govern); Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Oldham,
569 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (UCC provisions in state where contract is
made govern). See also Coogan, supra note 12, at 529-31; Weintraub, supra note 384,
at 691-702 (both discuss the issue of whether § 1-105 or §§ 9-102 and 9-103 should apply
to conflict of law problems).
1,7 See UCC § 9-103 comment 1 (1972). See also FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at
230.
, FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 230-31. See also Weintraub, supra note 384, at
691-93.
119 Coogan, supra note 12, at 530-31.
31 See UCC § 9-103 comment 1 (1972). See generally J. WrT & R. SuMaMEs,
supra note 218, at 964-76 (discusses the perfection rules found in § 9-103).
M' Coogan, supra note 12, at 530.
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1972 Amendments are not variable by agreement of the parties.3 92
This distinction is appropriate in view of the fact that the rules
of section 9-103 may affect the rights of individuals who are not
party to the agreement. 393
The 1972 Amendments would divide section 9-103 into five
subsections governing different types of collateral. The initial
subsection covers documents, instruments and ordinary goods. 394
Subsequent subsections cover goods subject to certificate of ti-
tle; 395 accounts, general intangibles and mobile goods; 39 6 chattel
paper; 397 and minerals. 398 A 1977 amendment would add a sixth
section regarding uncertificated securities. 399 The divisions seg-
regate collateral based upon the particular problems involved
with perfecting an interest in the type of collateral.4w For ex-
ample, accounts, general intangibles and mobile goods are
grouped together because situs oriented rules could not be ap-
plied easily to these types of collateral, which either have no
physical location or by their nature lack a fixed location. 40
Similarly, documents, instruments and ordinary goods are col-
lected under one rule because they are generally nonmobile col-
lateral kept in only one place. 402
1. Documents, Instruments and Ordinary Goods
a. The Basic Rule-The Last Event Test
Under the 1972 Amendments, the basic rule controlling or-
dinary goods is found in section 9-103(1)(b) which dictates that
392 J. W=T & R. StuMEmS, supra note 218, at 965.
'93 See In re Vintero Corp., 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1145 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980) ("parties to the original agreement may not, by agreement, make their choice of
law binding on creditors and purchasers who were not parties to the original agreement"),
rev'd sub nom. Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 675 F.2d 513
(2d Cir. 1982).
3- See UCC § 9-103(1) (1972).
9 See UCC § 9-103(2) (1972).
- See UCC § 9-103(3) (1972).
M See UCC § 9-103(4) (1972).
M See UCC § 9-103(5) (1972).
3- See UCC § 9-103(6) (1977).
See generally J. WE & R. SuMMEts, supra note 218, at 965 ("The drafters
chose this scheme mainly because the nature of the collateral suggests which state should
serve as the focal point for giving notice to third parties."); Coogan, supra note 12, at
531-32 (explains why certain types of collateral are grouped together).
401 See UCC § 9-103 comment 5(a) (1972).
*0 J. WrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 218, at 966.
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a secured party's perfection or nonperfection depends upon "the
law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the last event
occurs on which is based the assertion that the security interest
is perfected or unperfected."''4 The proposed change differs
from the current rule found in the first sentence of section 9-
103(3)404 in two respects. First, it refers only to perfection and
deletes the confusing reference to the validity of the security
agreement. 40 5 Second, it specifies that the crucial location for
perfection is the location of the collateral when the last event
related to perfection occurs. 4 This shifts the focus from that
of the current Code which requires application of the law of the
location of the collateral when attachment occurs. 4°7
Like its predecessor, the 1972 Amendment requires attention
to both chronological events and location since it dictates that
the governing law is that of a particular place at a particular
time. As commentators have often pointed out,405 perfection
depends upon both attachment and compliance with require-
ments for filing, possession or automatic perfection.4 Attach-
ment itself depends upon three events: (1) satisfaction of the
Article Nine statute of frauds by a writing or possession; (2)
value given by the secured party; and (3) the debtor's having
rights in the collateral. 410 The events necessary for attachment
and perfection are not required to occur in any particular or-
der. 411 Moreover, the necessary events other than filing may
occur either prior to or after filing.412
- UCC § 9-103(I)(b) (1972).
See KRS § 355.9-103(3).
- See UCC § 9-103(1)(b) (1972). See also Coogan, supra note 12, at 529-30.
- See UCC § 9-103(l)(b) (1972). See In re SSC Corp., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 828 (Bankr. D. Utah 1979). See generally Kripke, The Last Event Test for
Perfection of Security Interests Under Article 9 of- the Uniform Commercial Code, 50
N.Y.U. L. REv. 47 (1975).
See KRS § 355.9-103(3).
4 See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. Stmmmas, supra note 218, at 966 (perfection does not
occur until all steps are completed); Coogan, supra note 12, at 537 ("[a] security interest
generally is perfected only upon the completion of five steps.").
See KRS §§ 355.9-204, .9-302, .9-303, .9-304, .9-305; UCC §§ 9-203, 9-302, 9-
303, 9-304, 9-305 (1972).
110 See UCC § 9-203 (1972). THE 1972 AMENDMENTS have combined the concepts
of enforceability and attachments. Compare KRS §§ 355.9-203, .9-204.
41 UCC § 9-203(2) (1972) states that attachment occurs "as soon as all of the
events in subsection (1) have taken place," implying that they may take place in any
order. See also KRS § 355.9-204(1).
412 See Coogan, supra note 12, at 537-38 ("[s]teps necessary for perfection may
occur in any order").
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When ordinary goods are moving across several states, the
last event rule requires careful attention from a secured party.
Suppose, for example, that SP, a Kentucky secured lender,
wishes to advance money to D, a debtor with a plant located in
Kentucky, against nonmobile equipment currently located in D's
Florida plant but which D will relocate to a Kentucky installa-
tion. Assuming that SP has no perfected interest in the collateral
which precedes this transaction, 413 the agreement might be signed
while the collateral is still located in Florida and the loan ad-
vanced while the equipment is in transit.414 Because D already
has rights in this collateral, 415 the last of the steps necessary for
perfection will be SP's filing, 416 assuming that it has not been
made prior to the advance. The 1972 Amendments state that SP
should file where the collateral is located at the time SP makes
the filing because that is the last event upon which perfection is
based. 41 7 Technically, if SP files in Kentucky as the goods are
passing through Georgia, he or she has filed in the wrong place418
and his or her interest remains unperfected at least until the
arrival of the goods in Kentucky. 41 9
Perhaps the chances of a lien creditor levying on equipment
passing through Georgia on its way to Kentucky are too remote
to justify major concern. 420 Other examples of the difficulties
with the last event rule are less remote. Suppose that SP2, a
Kentucky lender, lends to D2, a Kentucky corporation with
plants in Kentucky and Ohio, against collateral not subject to a
" If S's interest in the collateral were perfected prior to its entry into Kentucky,
the rule of § 9-103(1)(d) would govern under the 1972 AMENDMENTs. See UCC § 9-
103(l)(d), 9-103 comment 1 (1972).
4" The argreement and advance would satisfy two of the requirements of § 9-203.
See UCC §§ 9-203(I)(a), (b); 9-203 comment 1 (1972).
415 UCC § 9-203(1)(c) (1972). See KRS §§ 355.9-204(1).
416 See KRS § 355.9-303. TME 1972 AMENDMENTS make no change in the require-
ments for perfection.
"I See UCC § 9-103(1)(b). See also In re Lucasa Int'l, Ltd., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 622 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("last event" was fling). See In re My Place
or Yours, Inc., 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 998 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); Ingersoll-
Rand Fin. Corp. v. Nunley, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1114 (W.D. Va. 1981).
41" See Coogan, supra note 12, at 539.
41 See id.
"11 Id. at 540. "S may be content to take the risk of having his security unperfected
while the goods are in transit. It is improbable that another creditor of D will levy on
the goods during such period because the creditor is unlikely to know where the goods
are located ..... " Id.
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prior security interest and currently located in D2's Ohio plant.
The loan is made under a written and signed security agreement42'
containing an after-acquired property clause. 422 However, SP2
had made no commitment to make future advances to D2 under
the agreement. 423 SP2 files in Ohio. Before SP2 makes an actual
advance to D2, D2 moves the collateral to Kentucky. Under the
1972 Amendments' last event test, SP2's advance would be the
last event and SP2 should have filed in Kentucky. 424
Given this parade of hypothetical horribles, why should this
portion of the 1972 Amendments be approved by any legislature?
In the first instance, it is important to remember that the basic
rule under the present Code can be interpreted to raise similar
difficulties with the difference of a focus on attachment rather
than perfection. 425 The 1972 Amendments are in part, therefore,
a clarification of an existing scheme. The choices faced by the
ALI and the NCCUSL in drafting the 1972 Amendments were
limited by the same combination of geographic and political
considerations that have influenced the choices of states in en-
acting or revising secton 9-401 on intrastate filing.426 A rule that
required filing at the debtor's location might have hampered
some local lenders who dealt with multistate debtors whose chief
place of businesss was distantly located.4 27 The ideal of having
UCC filings made at a national center available for local access
through computer terminals was not possible.428
Other reasons for acceptance of the last event rule also exist.
Most of the problems with the rule have been thoroughly hy-
pothesized and discussed. Some solutions for the cautious se-
cured party have been offered.4 29 For example, the secured creditor
421 See UCC § 9-203(1)(a) (1972).
- See UCC § 9-204(3) (1972).
42, This hypothetical is based on material from Coogan, supra note 12, at 538. The
absence of any commitment to make future advances is important in this hypothetical
because it assures that S has not given value until S makes the actual loan. See KRS §
355.1-201(44) (defimes when a person "gives value").
I- See UCC § 9-103(1)(b). See also Coogan, supra note 12, at 538-39.
4- See KRS § 355.9-103(3).
411 See Coogan, supra note 12, at 533-34.
427 Id.
423 Id.
429 See J. WrrrE & R. SunamRs, supra note 218 (each of these authorities closely
scrutinizes the 1972 Amendments to § 9-103 and its "last event" rule); Hansel & Davis,
The Choice of Law Rules of the Iowa Uniform Commercial Code, 33 DAKE L. REv.
561 (1983-84); Schuschke, Conflict of Laws and the Security Interest: The Four-Month
Rule of UCC Section 9-103(1), 85 Com. L.J. 525 (1980). See generally Coogan, supra
note 12; Weintraub, supra note 384.
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in the first hypothetical given above could assure himself or
herself of protection by filing in Florida and perfecting an in-
terest in the goods before they are removed from that state.
40
In that event, under the 1972 Amendments, the creditor would
generally have four months in which to file in Kentucky in order
to remain perfected in this state.431 Finally, the 1972 Amend-
ments' basic choice of law rule for ordinary goods should be
judged in light of other alternatives available under modern
choice of law rules.432 In a field such as secured transactions,
certainty and predictability are at a premium. Weighing the
contacts that a transaction has with a jurisdiction, or determining
a forum's interest in the application of its law to a given trans-
action, is a hazardous activity which guarantees neither certainty
nor predictability. Adoption of the last event rule and its situs
oriented focus would provide only known and avoidable hazards
for secured parties and debtors. To deviate from that rule would
destroy the essential purpose of uniformity that underlies the
UCC. 4 33
b. Exceptions to the Last Event Rule
Section 9-103 also contains two exceptions to the basic last
event rule. The first of these exceptions is found in section 9-
103(1)(c) which extends protection to a creditor whose purchase
430 In such a case the secured party's rights would be governed by § 9-103(I)(d).
See text accompanying notes 446-53 infra.
411 See text accompanying notes 446-53 infra.
4, Modern choice of law theory generally divides into two camps: those who adhere
to the RESTATMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) and those who propose
offshoots of the governmental interest analysis proposed by Brainerd Currie. Although
the Second Restatement requires consideration of certainty and predictability as values
to be taken into account in determining choice of law questions, it does not guarantee
that a particular state's law will control. See generally W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 475-86 (8th ed. 1984). Kentucky courts have adopted the most
significant relationship test of the Second Restatement for general contracts questions.
See Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky. 1982);
Lewis v. Am. Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Ky. 1977); Prudential
Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). However, dicta
in Plunkett indicates that Kentucky courts might disregard the policies of other states if
Kentucky had a strong forum policy to advance. See 583 S.W.2d at 100. Cf. Foster v.
Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972) (so long as there are some significant contacts
with Kentucky, although not necessarily the most significant, then Kentucky law should
apply).
.3 See UCC § 1-102(1)(c) (1972).
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money security interest attaches while the goods are in one
jurisdiction, but whose understanding with the debtor at the
time of attachment is that the goods will be kept in another
jurisdiction. 414 In-such a case, a secured party is perfected by
filing in the state of destination for thirty days after the debtor
receives possession of the collateral and thereafter if the goods
arrive in the intended destination state within the thirty days.
Unlike its counterpart in the present Code, the section 9-103(l)(c)
rule is limited to purchase money secured parties. 435 Furthermore,
the understanding between the parties must exist at the time of
attachment. 4 6 Thus, if a debtor decides to ship the collateral
from a Michigan manufacturing seller to a Kentucky plant only
after the three events for attachment have occurred, the section
9-103(l)(c) rule does not apply. 437
The protection of the thirty-day rule would effect a compro-
mise between the need to protect the initial state's filing system-
by limiting the possibility that collateral can be located in the
state while being subject to protection without filing-and the
needs of the secured party.438 As a practical matter, the useful-
ness of the rule is somewhat limited.439 The rule states that, for
thirty days after the debtor receives possession of the goods, the
intended destination of the collateral is the place to file.440 There-
after, the state of intended destination is the place to file only
if the goods arrive in the state.441 If, after the thirty-day period,
the goods have not arrived at the intended destination and are
- See UCC § 9-103(1)(c) comment 2 (1972).
43S See KRS § 355.9-103(3) (the 30-day rule applies to all security interests, not just
purchase money security interests).
4M See UCC § 9-103(l)(c) (1972). The comments point out clearly that the 30-day
period is not a grace period during which no filing is required. See id. at comment 2.
Rather the section is intended to dictate in which of two jurisdictions the secured party
must file. See In re Duplan Corp., 455 F. Supp. 926, 930-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (plaintiff
never filed, so he possessed an unperfected security interest); In re SSC Corp., 27 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828 (Bankr. D. Utah 1979); Joint Holdings & Trading Co., Ltd.
v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 123 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (Ct. App. 1975) (no "understanding"
existed between the parties, so the security interest was unperfected).
417 See Coogan, supra note 12, at 536.
43 Id. at 543-44.
419 See J. Wsrr & R. SuMMERs, supra note 218, at 969.
4,0 UCC § 9-103(l)(c) and comment 3 (1972); FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 231.
- UCC § 9-103(1)(c) (1972).
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levied upon by another creditor, the secured party would lose to
that levying creditor. 442
By its own terms the protecton of section 9-103(l)(c) lapses
at the end of thirty days. 443 Section 9-103(1)(d) does not protect
the secured party who filed only in the state of intended desti-
nation, because that section governs "collateral perfected under
the law of the jurisdiction from which the collateral was re-
moved." 4" Cases of nonarrival are dangerous for the secured
party because he or she lacks the four month protection of
section 9-103(1)(d). However, that peril can be avoided by filing
in both states. 445
The second exception to the last event rule involves collateral
subject to a perfected security interest in one state prior to its
removal to a second state. The 1972 Amendments would retain
a grace period for reperfection in the destination state.4 6 This
grace period would extend for the lesser of four months from
the arrival of the collateral in the destination state or until the
secured party's filing lapsed in the removal state.447 Additionally,
the amendment would clarify several problems arising under
secton 9-103(3) of the present Code. The current language states
that a security interest perfected in the state from which the
collateral was removed "continues perfected in [the destination]
state for four months and also thereafter if within the four
month period it is perfected" in the destination state.448 Courts
have split over the status under the present Code of a secured
party who challenges a competing interest that arose during the




4" Id. Comment 3 states:
A failure of the collateral to reach the intended destination jurisdiction
before the expiration of the 30-day period because of a conflicting claim
or otherwise may cause disappointment of expectations that the law of the
destination jurisdiction will govern continuously, and caution may dictate
filing both in that jurisdiction and in the jurisdiction where the security
interest attaches.
- See UCC § 9-103(1)(d) (1972).
"7 See id.
-8 See KRS § 355.9-103(3).
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month period has run and without having taken any necessary
action to remain perfected in the destination state." 9
The 1972 Amendments provide that a secured creditor's in-
terest would be treated as having been unperfected during the
four month period as against a person who became a purchaser
after the collateral was removed from its original location.4 50
The Code definition of "purchaser" includes not only buyers
but also others who take by voluntary transactions, including
other secured parties. 451 This definition excludes, however, judg-
ment lien creditors and the bankruptcy trustee acting as a hy-
"' Some courts have treated the four month period as an absolute period of
protection. See, e.g., Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Dinner, 302 F. Supp. 897, 899
(D. Colo. 1969); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 306
So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974) ("continuity of the previously perfected security
interest remains unbroken" for four months after situs is moved from state one to state
two), cert. denied, 306 So. 2d 282 (Ala. 1974); Pascack Valley Bank & Trust Co. v.
Ritar Ford, Inc., 276 A.2d 800, 807 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1970) ("[A] perfected security
interest continues perfected in this state for four months. . . ."), cert. denied, 274 A.2d
884 (Conn. 1971); American State Bank v. White, 535 P.2d 424, 430 (Kan. 1975) ("[T]he
four month period ... is not a grace period for filing; it is an absolute period of
protection of the vendor's security interest.... .") (emphasis added by Court in citing
to Churchill Motors v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 229 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1962)),
superseded by statute/Rule Victory Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 636 P.2d 788 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981); Community Credit Co. v. Gilham, 214 N.W.2d 384, 388 (Neb. 1974); City Bank
& Trust Co. v. Warthen Serv. Co., 535 P.2d 162, 165 (Nev. 1975); First Nat'l Bank v.
Stamper, 225 A.2d 162, 169 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1966); Newton-WValtham Bank
& Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 327 N.Y.S.2d 77, 81-82 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971),
aff'd, 347 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. 1972); Al Maroone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto
Auction, Inc., 208 A.2d 290, 293 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965); First Bristol County Nat'l Bank
v. Shirley, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 378 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); Phil Phillips
Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 454 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970); Morris v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 516 P.2d 1055 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). Other
courts have treated the four month rule as affording only conditional protection. See,
e.g., United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp. 798, 802-05 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Arrow Ford,
Inc. v. Western Landscape Constr. Co., 532 P.2d 553, 556 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) ("[T]he
four-month period is a period of grace which is forfeited if the secured creditor does
not reperfect his interest within the four-month period.").
410 For a good discussion of case law and commentary on the issue, see International
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pefley, 458 N.E.2d 257, 261-65 (Ind. App. 1983) (the four-
month period is not one of absolute perfection). See also United States v. Burnette-
Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[The 1972 Official Text] clearly adopts
the conditional protection version of the four month rule."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996
(1978); FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 236.
451 See KRS § 355.1-201(32) to (33). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMIES, supra




pothetical lien creditor. 4 2 Assume for example, that SPI, a
secured creditor, is perfected by filing in Tennessee. The debtor
removes the collateral to Kentucky on January 10. On February
10, SP2, a second lender, creates and perfects a second security
interest in the collateral with a proper Kentucky filing. On May
20, SPI discovers the collateral in Kentucky and seeks to repos-
sess it. SP2's interest would prevail in the contest. SP2's interest
was properly perfected on February 10. Because SPI's lack of
perfection at the end of the four month period relates back as
against SP2, SPI loses. 453 If, however, SPI's competitor were a
judgment lien creditor who achieved that status during the four
month period, SPI would prevail. SPI was perfected during the
four-month period, and the lack of perfection at the end of the
four-month period would not relate back against a nonpur-
chaser. 454
The 1972 Amendments also provide that a refiling in the
destination state is unnecessary if the secured party is perfected
automatically without filing.455 Secured parties with purchase
money security interests in consumer goods may enjoy such
protection in the state from which the goods are removed under
that state's section 9-302(1)(d). The 1972 Amendments would
continue that protection in Kentucky.
2. Certificate of Title
The fit between Article Nine requirements and Kentucky's
certificate of title law has never been comfortable. 456 Recent
amendments to Kentucky's motor vehicle registration system
provide that notation on a certificate of title is the sole means
for determining priority in a motor vehicle. 457 The same statute,
J.2 j. WrT & R. SumamRS, supra note 218, at 976.
"' See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pefley, 458 N.E.2d at 265; United
States v. Burnette-Carter Co., 575 F.2d at 591; FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 236.
414 See J. WmTm & R. SUMMERS, supra note 218, at 976.
411 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 235-36.
' 6 See Note, Vehicular Registration in Kentucky: A Remnant of the Horse and
Buggy Age, 69 Ky. L.J. 124, 141 (1980-81) ("The one serious flaw with the Uniform
[Certificate of Title] Act is its uneasy relationship with Article 9 of the UCC." (footnote
omitted)).
45, See KRS § 186A.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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however, continues to provide that financing statements for cer-
tificate of title vehicles should be filed locally. 458
The 1972 Amendments to section 9-302 envision a very dif-
ferent scheme. With the exception of a security interest in col-
lateral held as inventory by the debtor,459 filing a financing
statement would be neither "necessary nor ... effective" to
perfect a security interest in property subject to a certificate of
title statute.46 If, for example, Mary Louise's Motors has an
inventory of one hundred new Belchfires, financed by Ned's
National Bank, Ned's must file to protect its security interest in
her inventory. 461 If, however, Mary Louise sells a car to Carl
Consumer and Carl gets Ned's to finance that purchase, Ned's
must note its lien on the certificate of title. Filing is neither
necessary nor effective to protect Ned's interest in Carl's car.
With its statement that notation is the equivalent of filing,
section 9-302(4) of the 1972 Amendments further supports these
exclusive certificate of title rules.462
The problem lies not with the Article Nine amendments but
with Kentucky's existing certificate of title law. Although that
law has been amended to ensure that priorities in titled vehicles
are governed by certificate of title and not by Article Nine
priority rules, 463 the certificate of title statute continues to be
replete with references to financing statements. 46 The current
certificate of title statute seems to envision a parallel system of
45 See KRS § 186A.190(5) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
419 See UCC § 9-302(3)(h) (1972).
46 See UCC § 9-302(3), (4) and comment 8 (1972). Section 3 provides that a
financing statement is not necessary for collateral covered by any listed statute. Section
4 provides that compliance with the listed statute is the equivalent of filing. Id. See also
FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 237-39.
"' See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 239.
462 See UCC § 9-302(4) (1972); FmiN REPORT, supra note 6, at 237-38. "While the
Code's sponsoring organizations cannot amend certificate of title laws, it is hoped that
certificate of title laws will be amended or construed so that the Code filing system for
inventory will be exclusive and will not be duplicated by the certificate of title system."
FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 238.
"I See Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961); Mc-
Kenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102, 106-08 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (defendant holds an
unperfected security interest in motor vehicle because notation of lien was not recorded
on certificate of title); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hodge, 485 S.W.2d 894,
896 (Ky. 1972) (financing statement filed without recording on certificate of title is not
an enforceable lien).
- See KRS §§ 186A.190, .195, .200 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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both financing statements and notations on a certificate of ti-
tle.4s Adoption of the 1972 Amendments would make filing
irrelevant under Article Nine.466 However, the certificate of title
statute would retain the filing requirements. 467
This result may be no more confusing than the current rules.
Present section 9-302(3)(b) states that the filing provisions of
Article Nine do not apply to a security interest in property
subject to a statute which requires indication of a security inter-
est on a certificate of title.468 The Code drafters intended, even
under this earlier version, that notation on the certificate would
substitute for filing. Thus, notation would govern the issues of
both perfection and priority between the secured party and other
individuals. The current Kentucky certificate of title statute states
that notation governs priority, but it makes no provision for the
perfection of a security interest by notation. 469 The statute is by
no means clear, but interpreting it not to require indication on
the certificate strains credulity. 470
Secured parties are generally interested in perfection because
it is the certain avenue to priority, which after all is the crux of
the game. 47' Further, even if the legislature intended to require
both notation and filing for perfection, KRS section 186A.190
still requires notation on the certificate. 472 The current certificate
of title law thus stands in conflict with the present Code. Al-
though adoption of the 1972 Amendments would clarify the
status of vehicles held as inventory, only a revision of the
certificate of title rules would cure the other problems.473
The need for revision of the certificate of title laws becomes
even clearer in a transaction in which a vehicle subject to Ken-
4 See id.
- UCC § 9-302(3), (4) (1972); FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 237-38.
- See KRS § 186A.190.
- See KRS § 355.9-302(3)(b).
- See KRS § 186A.190.
4- KRS § 355.9-302(3)(b) does not mention perfection. It only states that Article
Nine's filing provisions do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a statute
of this state which requires indication of a security interest on a certificate of title. It is
helpful to compare the language of UCC § 9-103(2)(a) (1972) relating to indication of a
security interest on the certificate of title as a "condition of perfection."
41" See text accompanying notes 170-216 supra (discussion of how priority is deter-
mined).
- See KRS § 186A.190(l) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
47 See text accompanying notes 464-71 supra.
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tucky's title laws leaves the state and is reregistered elsewhere.
Should that reregistration occur in a state which has adopted
the 1972 Amendments to the UCC, section 9-103(2)(a) states that
it applies to goods covered by the forum state's title law or by
the law of another jurisdiction which requires indication of the
security interest on the certificate of title as a condition of
perfection.474 The forum state may have some difficulty in de-
termining whether Kentucky requires notation on the certificate
as a condition of perfection. 475 If the forum state determines
that Kentucky's reference to priority does not mandate notation
as a condition of perfection, the protection afforded Kentucky
secured parties as against persons other than nonprofessional
buyers will be only the general protection under section 9-103(1)(d)
afforded to secured parties with an interest in ordinary goods.476
Section 9-103(2)(c) requires this result by providing that a secu-
rity interest perfected in another jurisdiction other than by no-
tation on the certificate of title receives only such protection.477
If the problems with the certificate of title law are resolved,
the operation of section 9-103(2) may be illustrated as follows:
a. Movement from a Certificate of Title State to Kentucky
When a vehicle enters Kentucky from a jurisdiction requiring
notation of the security interest on the certificate of title as a
condition of perfection, subsection (2)(a) would dictate that the
rules of section 9-103(2) apply.478 Under subsection (2)(b), 479
- UCC § 9-103(2)(a) (1972) (emphasis added).
4" But cf. Lightfoot v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 357 So. 2d 654, 655 (Ala.
1978) (The court refused to give "condition of perfection" a narrow and technical
reading and because the UCC "is intended to give full force and effect to certificate of
title statutes like [Kentucky's] and only a drafting error prevents the smooth interlocking
mesh between the UCC and the certificate of title statutes as intended by the drafters.").
47 See UCC § 9-103(2)(c) (1972).
4" See id.
4,1 See UCC § 9-103(2)(a) (1972).
"I UCC § 9-103(2)(b) applies when the goods are covered by a certificate of title
issued by either the state from which they were removed or the state of destination.
UCC § 9-103(2)(a), (2)(b) (1972). Because the section speaks only of the "jurisdiction
issuing the certificate," some confusion results. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note
218, at 978-81; Coogan, supra note 12, at 544-50. "In a connoisseur's list of the most
confusing and frustrating problems arising under Article 9, there would surely be a case
or two involving a multi-state situation and one or more certificate of title statutes."
Coogan, supra note 12, at 544. Most authorities agree that "the certificate" means that
issued by the removal state for the first four months or until the original certificate of
title is surrendered. Thereafter, "the certificate" means the certificate issued by the
destination or second state. See J. Wm & R. SuM, aaS, supra note 218, at 979; FINAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 240.
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perfection and its effect are governed for at least four months
by the law of the state from which the vehicle was removed.4 10
Suppose a Texas creditor has noted its lien on the certificate
of title and the vehicle subject to the security interest is brought
into Kentucky and reregistered with a clean certificate of title.
If the Texas creditor asserted its interest within the four-month
period, it would prevail over a Kentucky creditor who loaned
against the vehicle and had its interest noted on the new Ken-
tucky certificate of title. 48 1 If the Texas creditor asserted its
interest after the four-month period, it would lose to the Ken-
tucky creditor in the preceding hypothetical. 482
It might be argued that the Texas creditor would enjoy
absolute protection for four months. That argument will arise
because section 9-103(2)(b)'s language mimics the present Code's
language in section 9-103(3).483 In nontitle contexts, some courts
have interpreted the statement that the removal jurisdiction's law
governs for "four months and thereafter" to permit a secured
party to enjoy four months absolute protection. 484 The comments
to the 1972 Amendments indicate that the drafters did not intend
this absolute grace period. 485 Of course, under section 9-103(2)(b),
the four months protection can be cut short by surrender of the
certificate of title. 486
Although the protection given by this section is nearly par-
allel to the protection afforded ordinary goods, it is not exactly
the same. Under section 9-103(1)(d), the four-month grace period
for ordinary goods begins to run when the collateral is brought
into the forum state. 487 Under section 9-103(2)(b), the four-
month grace period for certificate of title goods refers to the
date upon which the collateral is removed from the jurisdiction
-- UCC § 9-103(2)(b) (1972). The comment states: "The section provides that the
certificate ceases to control after 4 months following removal if registration has oc-
curred.... ." Id. at comment 4(c).
481 Id. See also J. Wmar & R. Sumarms, supra note 218, at 978-79.
I-2 See UCC § 9-103(2)(b) (1972). See also In re Hartberg, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1429 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (Florida bank's security interest lapsed four months
after debtor removed car to Wisconsin and registered it because bank failed to perfect
in Wisconsin within the four-month period).
3 See KRS § 355.9-103(3).
4U See cases cited supra note 449.
" See UCC § 9-103(2)(b), comment 4(c) (1972).
416 See UCC § 9-103(2)(b); FiNA REPORT, supra note 6, at 239.
4- See UCC § 9-103(l)(d)(i) (1972).
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issuing the first certificate of title.488 Committee reports indicate
that the drafters believed that the tests in the two sections were
the same.489 Removal from State A, however, need not be syn-
onymous with collateral being brought into State B in every
case. Further, a secured party might receive more than the four
months protection afforded for ordinary goods if the vehicle
were not reregistered in Kentucky. 490
A secured party whose interest would generally be protected
by section 9-103(2)(b) is nevertheless subject to the interest of
one important class of rivals under the 1972 Amendments. Sec-
tion 9-103(2)(d) states that notwithstanding the other provisions
of the section, a nonprofessional buyer-who, without knowl-
edge of the security interest, gives value and takes delivery after
a certificate of title is issued in the destination state-prevails
over a secured party whose lien was noted only on the certificate
of title issued by the removal state.491 The category "nonprofes-
sional buyer" excludes automobile dealers and secured parties. 492
b. Movement from a Nontitle State to Kentucky
Vehicles entering Kentucky from states that do not require
notation on the title as a condition of perfection would be treated
under the rule of section 9-103(2)(c). 491 That section dictates that
a secured party with an interest in the vehicle receive the same
treatment as a secured party with an interest in ordinary goods
under secion 9-103(1)(d). 494 Vehicles entering from nontitle states
See UCC § 9-103(2)(b) (1972).
419 Fn AL REPORT, supra note 6, at 240.
410 Id. Cf. In re Nunley, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 253 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982).
Perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle which is brought into
a jurisdiction which has adopted the 1962 version of the UCC continues if
the certificating state requires indication of the security interest on the
certificate of title as a condition of perfection and the security interest is
perfected in the jurisdiction which issued the certificate of title.
Id. at 253-54.
,91 UCC § 9-103(2)(d) (1972). See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 40-41.
49 See J. WmTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 218, at 985-86.
493 See UCC § 9-103(2)(c) (1972).
414 Id. The secured party's interest would be perfected for four months. If the
secured party failed to take action at the end of that period his interest would be deemed
to have been unperfected as against a party who became a purchaser during that period.
See text accompanying notes 446-53 supra.
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could also be subject to priority claims of nonprofessional buy-
ers.
495
c. Movement from Kentucky to a Title State
The difficulties in this area have already been mentioned. 496
While Kentucky courts may wish to assert that Kentucky is a
certificate of title state, the courts in other states will apply the
criteria in section 9-103(2)(a) to determine Kentucky's status. 497
If Kentucky is treated as a title state, the Kentucky secured party
will be protected for four months and thereafter until the vehicle
is reregistered in the state of destination or the certificate of title
is surrendered.498 After that period, a clean certificate of title in
the destination jurisdiction will control. 499 If Kentucky is treated
as a nontitle state, the Kentucky creditor will receive ordinary
goods protection under section 9-103(l)(d).: °
3. Accounts, General Intangibles and Mobile Goods
The 1972 Amendments would unify accounts, general intan-
gibles and mobile goods under a single rule.501 Under the present
Code, perfection of accounts or contract rights is controlled by
the law of the jurisdiction where the assignor keeps his or her
records.5 0 2 For general intangibles and mobile goods, however,
perfection depends upon the law of the chief place of business
of the debtor.503 The 1972 Amendments would require filing at
491 See UCC § 9-103(2)(d) (1972) (outlining the requirements the nonprofessional
buyer must meet to take priority over the secured party).
496 See text accompanying notes 468-76 supra.
497 See id.
I- See UCC § 9-103(2)(c) (1972).
499 See id.
mO See note 494 supra.
'0 In order to qualify under UCC § 9-103(3), goods must meet several requirements.
First, the goods must be mobile. See Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Nunley, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1114 (W.D. Va. 1981) (coal mining equipment not mobile).
Second, the goods must be of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction. See
In re J.A. Thompson & Son, Inc., 665 F.2d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 1982) (compactors and
bulldozers are usually mobile goods). Third, the goods must be either equipment or
inventory leased or held for lease by the debtor to others. See In re Utah Agricorp,
Inc., 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1712 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). Finally the goods
must not be covered by certificate of title.
- See KRS § 355.9-103(1).
- See KRS § 355.9-103(2).
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the debtor's location for all interests in mobile goods, general
intangibles or accounts.5 4 This rule reflects the fact that these
types of collateral either have no physical location or inherently
change location so often that location cannot provide a reliable
basis for filing. 05
Under the 1972 Amendments, a debtor with a place of
business would be deemed located at the place of business.5es A
debtor with more than one place of business would be located
at his or her chief executive office. 0 7 The official comments to
the 1972 Amendments indicate that "chief executive office"
refers, not to the state of incorporation, but to the place from
which the debtor manages operations.5 08 This rule is a sensible
one because the state of incorporation ordinarily has little inter-
est in requiring secured parties to file in its records.: 9 If the
debtor changes his or her location, a security interest perfected
under the rules of section 9-103(3) remains perfected for four
months after the debtor's move or until perfection is terminated
in the original location. 10 This rule of section 9-103(3)(e) is
similar to the ordinary goods rule in section 9-103(1)(d) since a
secured party's failure to reperfect within four months causes,
as against a party who is a purchaser, his or her lack of perfec-
tion to relate back to the debtor's move.5 1
4. Chattel Paper, Minerals and Uncertificated Securities
The 1972 and 1977 Amendments also attempt to specify rules
for chattel paper, minerals and uncertificated securities in mul-
- See UCC § 9-103(3)(b) (1972).
' Id. at comment 5(b).
See UCC § 9-103(3)(d) (1972). Compare Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Rovi
Property & Management Corp., 607 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (equipment and
excavation work done in Kentucky does not create place of business within state) with
Davidson v. Smith Canadian Peat, Inc., 294 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (all business
operations located in South Carolina, so Georgia law does not govern); and In re
Astrocade, Inc., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1391 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (chief
executive office located in California, not Ohio).
- UCC § 9-103(3)(d) (1972). See In re J.A. Thompson & Son, Inc., 665 F.2d at
950 (" '[P]lace of management' focuses on the location which serves as executive
headquarters for the debtor's multi-state operation, and not on the location which
generates the largest business volume.").
See UCC § 9-103 comment 5(c) (1972).
See id.
$10 UCC § 9-103(3)(e) (1972).
"I1 See id. See also text accompanying notes 446-53 supra.
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tistate situations. The rules with regard to chattel paper depend
upon whether a secured party's attempt to perfect his or her
interest is by filing or by possession. When a secured party's
interest is perfected by possession, the amendments make appli-
cable the law of the jurisdiction in which the chattel paper is
located.5 12 Where filing is used to perfect, the secured party must
file in the state where the debtor is located.5 13
Section 9-103(5) provides that a secured party with a security
interest in minerals that attaches as they are extracted must file
in the state where the mine or wellhead is located.5 1 4 This rule
avoids searching the files in many states to discover the interests
of multiple assignors.
For uncertificated securities, the law of the jurisdiction where
the issuer is organized governs perfection and its effect.51 5 Pre-
sumably, organization means the state of incorporation for cor-
porations. The rule is a reasonable one since the state of
incorporation has an interest in regulating the structure of the
corporation it creates.
II. THE 1977 AND 1966 AmENDMENTS
Two other sets of uniform amendments to the Official Text
of the UCC have been promulgated by the ALI and NCCUSL.
The more extensive set is the 1977 Amendments which relate to
investment securities. 51 6 They have been substantially enacted in
at least thirteen jurisdictions.5 7 The other set, the 1966 Amend-
ments, is less extensive but more broadly focused.1 8 Portions of
this set have been enacted in at least twenty-six jurisdictions. 51 9
The 1977 Amendments grew out of the paperwork "crunch"
experienced in the securities markets during the late 1960s. 520
512 UCC § 9-103(4) (1972) states that the § 9-103(1) rule will apply.
51 UCC § 9-401 (1972). Nonpossessory interests in chattel paper shall be governed
by the rules in § 9-103(3). UCC § 9-103(4) (1972).
'" See UCC § 9-103(5) (1972).
I' See UCC § 9-103(6) (1977).
516 See 1977 A NrNDarms, supra note 6. For a comprehensive discussion of the
1977 AmENDMmNTS, see Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, Article 8 Is Ready, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 889 (1980). The 1977 A .a-Earrs relating to multistate transactions are discussed
at note 515 supra and accompanying text.
517 See generally Tables, supra note 3.
,' See 1966 AimEDmENTs, supra note 6.
", See generally TABLES, supra note 3.
,20 See 1977 A .maErNrs, supra note 6, at xv.
19851
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
This crunch resulted from the need to process a huge volume of
share certificates. Initially, a committee operating under the
auspices of the American Bar Association proposed that Article
Eight of the then current Official Text of the UCC be amended
to regulate uncertificated shares. 521 The 1977 Amendments are
an outgrowth of this recommendation. Their scope and purpose
have been described as follows:
Perhaps the best approach to describing the scope of the
revision is first to state what it does not do. The revision does
not compel the issuance of uncertificated securities by any
issuer. Furthermore, the revision does not authorize the issu-
ance of uncertificated securities, a function of the state cor-
poration laws. What the revision is intended to accomplish is
to set forth a coherent group of rules for the issuers, buyers,
sellers and other persons dealing with uncertificated securities,
to the same extent that present Article 8 deals with these
matters with respect to certificated securities. Although the
primary focus of inquiry regarding the possible elimination of
certificates has been on corporate stock, the revision is broad
enough to cover uncertificated debt securities, should such be
issued in the future. It might be noted that the most significant
uncertificated system now in operation is that conducted by
the Federal Reserve Banks for United States Government Bonds.
It is possible, and, indeed, probable, that particular issues of
securities may, temporarily or even permanently, be partly
certificated and partly uncertificated. If such be the case, the
choice of form will lie with the owner and provisions are made
for exchangeability at the owner's option .... 122
The 1977 Amendments would add four new sections to Ar-
ticle Eight of the present Code. 5 23 There also would be some
wording and structural changes to the existing provisions.5 24 In
some instances the rules for certificated securities are modified
to reflect modern securities practices. In most cases, however,
521 Id.
2 Id. at xvi-xvii.
5 See KRS §§ 355.8-102 to .8-406. There are a few non-uniform provisions among
these sections. See KRS §§ 355.8-102(3), .8-301(1). The present Code's § 355.8-102(3) is
similar to UCC § 8-102(3) (1977). See note 6 supra.
124 The 1977 AAmENDMsuNTs modified several Code sections that were previously
amended by the 1972 Amendments. See UCC §§ 1-201, 9-103, 9-105, 9-203, 9-302, 9-
304, 9-305, 9-312 (1977).
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the precise language of the rules relating to certificated securities
would be preserved. The new rules for uncertificated securities
were designed "to conform as closely as possible to the rules
for certificated shares."' ' 25 One important facet of the 1977
Amendments is that they would enable owners of uncertificated
securities to employ these assets as collateral in secured trans-
actions.: 26 Owners of certificated securities have traditionally
been able to do this in pledge transactions.5 27
The 1966 Amendments are a small but diverse lot.528 For
example, one would add a new section to the present UCC
specifying that subordination agreements (such as where one
creditor subordinates its right to payment by a debtor to that of
another creditor) do not create a security interest unless so
intended. 529 Another would amend the present Code in order to
make the Article Two seller's reclamation rights superior to the
rights of lien creditors of the buyer.5 0 A third 1966 Amendment
provides for expanding the class of nonprivity plaintiffs with
standing to sue sellers for breach of warranty. 53'
CONCLUSION
The original enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in
Kentucky was a very progressive step. The need for moderniza-
tion was particularly acute in the area of secured transactions
where Kentucky law had fallen badly behind most American
jurisdictions. 532 Kentucky law also provided little guidance for
persons concerned with investment securities.53 3 As the third
legislative body to enact the Code, the General Assembly made
'2 1977 AmtEsDMETS, supra note 6, at xvii-xviii.
11 See, e.g., UCC §§ 8-102(b), 8-108 (1977).
,27 See id. 1977 AmENDm Ers, supra note 6, at xx; KRS § 355.9-102(2).
su The 1972 Amendments modified two Code sections that were previously amended
by the 1966 Amendments. See UCC §§ 9-105, 9-106 (1972).
:29 See UCC § 1-209 (1966). Cf. KRS § 355.9-316.
-, See UCC § 2-702(3) (1966).
531 See UCC § 2-318 (1966). The defense of lack of privity was considered in Dealers
Transport Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965). See generally Brickey,
Products Liability in Kentucky: The Doctrinal Dilemma, 65 Ky. L.J. 593 (1976-77).
532 See Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes the Law of Chattel Security, 48 KY. L.J. 369,
369-74 (1959-60).
" See Wyatt, Investment Securities-Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
48 Ky. L.J. 333, 333-36 (1959-60).
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Kentucky a leader in the movement to modernize commercial
law and to make it uniform.53 4 The uniform amendients to the
Code, particularly those adopted by the ALI and NCCUSL in
1972 and 1977, provide the vehicle to continue this process and
should be given careful legislative consideration.
'1 See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
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